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THE IMPENDING STORM:
THE SUPREME COURT'S FORAY INTO
THE SECOND AMENDMENT DEBATE
Christopher Keleher*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Parker v. District of Columbia made history as the first in-

stance a federal appellate court struck a law on Second Amendment grounds. 1 In Parker,the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit held the District of Columbia's firearm ordinance
infringed on the Second Amendment. The provisions at issue
banned handguns not registered prior to 1976, barred the movement of registered handguns within one's home without a license,
and mandated all registered firearms be kept unloaded and either
locked or disassembled. Without equivocation, the D.C. Circuit
held the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep
and bear arms.
The reverberations of this bombshell will extend far beyond
the banks of the Potomac. Prior to Parker, federal courts had
overwhelmingly construed the right to keep and bear arms as extending to state militias, not individuals. As militias are a relic of
a bygone era, such an interpretation renders the right to keep and
bear arms nugatory. The Supreme Court's near seventy-year silence on the Second Amendment has permitted this reading to
persist. Parker shattered this solitude, as the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and will determine the parameters of the right
to keep and bear arms for the first time since 1939.
This article asserts three distinct, yet related points. First,
the D.C. Circuit's Second Amendment interpretation is correct as
a matter of law and liberty. Second, when the Supreme Court interprets the Second Amendment, it should consider how states
have treated firearm rights. Third, as the Supreme Court is increasingly using constitutional comparativism as an aid to inter* The author is an attorney practicing law at Kubasiak, Flystra, Thorpe & Rotunno in Chicago,
Illinois. He expresses gratitude to his family members for their guidance.
1. Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see David Nakamura & Robert
Barnes, D.C.'s Ban on Handguns in Homes Is Thrown out, Wash. Post A01 (Mar. 10, 2007).
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the case became D.C. v. Heller when the D.C. Circuit
found lead plaintiff Shelly Parker lacked standing. Parker,478 F.3d at 375-78.
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pret the Constitution, it should address the consequences curtailing firearm rights has wrought in other countries.
Pontificating on the Second Amendment has become a cottage
industry. The purpose of this piece is not to add another detailed
history of the right to keep and bear arms to the discussion. Instead, it examines the implications of Parker v. District of Columbia. To this end, Part II presents a brief overview of Second
Amendment interpretations and case law. 2 It then describes the
District of Columbia's firearm regulations and the Parker litigation.
Part III analyzes the D.C. Circuit's decision in Parker.3 While
pilloried by many commentators, Parkeris a welcome respite from
the gradual disintegration of the right to keep and bear arms.
Second Amendment rights of many Americans have been undermined, and in some instances eviscerated, for too long. Parkeroffers the Supreme Court the opportunity to give the Second
Amendment an expansive interpretation and restore its guarantees.
The remainder of this piece contemplates how the Supreme
Court will interpret the Second Amendment. When facing issues
of constitutional magnitude, the Court often considers two factors
in its arsenal of adjudication. The first is the legislative trends of
the States. The second is international law. This article does not
debate the merits of these approaches. Rather, it analyzes the
role these elements could play in a Second Amendment decision.
Part IV considers how national consensus influences the Supreme Court. 4 It first explores states' constitutional and statutory
treatment of firearm rights. This section then examines cases involving abortion, homosexual rights, the death penalty, and euthanasia. The Court's invocation of national trends in these cases
is considered. This factor is elevated in matters of first impression
or where the Court revisits an issue. As the Court has not interpreted the Second Amendment since 1939, there is a compelling
basis to consider how States have grappled with gun rights in the
interim. Part IV concludes that the Court should maintain
consistency and examine the national consensus surrounding the
right to keep and bear arms. The social, legal, and legislative
trends coalesce around a robust individual right to keep and bear
arms. This consensus provides justification for the Court to ac2. See infra nn. 7-49 and accompanying text.
3. See infra nn. 120-44 and accompanying text.
4. See infra nn. 155-284 and accompanying text.
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knowledge the Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right.
Constitutional comparativism is another element influencing
the Supreme Court. As Part V sets forth, the Court has considered the international community's treatment of issues such as5
homosexual rights, affirmative action, and the death penalty.
Given this pattern, the Court could delve into foreign opinion concerning firearms. If the Court is to consider the international
community's approach to firearm rights, it should look beyond the
recent pronouncements condemning firearms. While current
views are salient, past experiences are instructive. Part V examines instances of foreign governments undermining firearm
rights. 6 History is scarred with examples of disarmament being
the prelude to atrocities. Too often, the nefarious nature of eradicating guns is never given its proper due. The Court should explore this phenomenon, for a consideration of international views
would be incomplete without it.
An inherent inconsistency between the positions regarding
constitutional comparativism and national consensus must be addressed at the outset. The argument that current international
views should be downplayed takes the opposite stance of the claim
that recent state developments should be emphasized. This seemingly conflicting line of reasoning can be rationalized. This article
does not advocate discounting the origins of the right to keep and
bear arms or ignoring eighteenth- and nineteenth-century firearm
regulations in interpreting the Second Amendment. It simply contends that current national consensus is pertinent to the discussion. Similarly, if the Court contemplates foreign jurisprudence
concerning firearms, contemporary international views are germane. However, the Court should also acknowledge the historical
realities of inhibiting individual firearm rights.
II.

SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: THE

ROAD

TO PARKER

The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 7 The D.C.
Circuit's decision in Parkerv. Districtof Columbia is the most recent federal appellate opinion interpreting the Second Amend5. See infra nn. 285-311 and accompanying text.
6. See infra nn. 324-81 and accompanying text.
7. U.S. Const. amend. II.
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ment. To place it in proper perspective, one must consider the
various Second Amendment readings and the cases culminating
in Parker.
A.

Interpretingthe Right to Keep and Bear Arms

Two competing Second Amendment interpretations envelop
the debate. These interpretations are the "individual right" and
the "collective right."8 Under the collective right reading, the Second Amendment protects only the States' right to maintain a militia.9 As a result, an individual has no constitutionally protected
right to keep or bear arms. 10 Diametrically opposed to this reading is the individual right model, which contends the Second
Amendment protects an individual's right to keep and bear arms,
independent of militia service.11 For support, individualists cite
the Second Amendment's text, the Framers' understanding of the
right, and the ubiquitous nature of firearms during colonial
12
times.
Some commentators denounce the individual versus collective
division as outmoded. 13 While the dichotomy remains, increased
attention to the Second Amendment has produced other interpretations.' 4 One view that carries increasing currency is a derivation of the individualist reading, described as the "narrow individ8. Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today? 76 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 291, 293-94 (2000); Paul Finkelman, "A Well Regulated Militia". The Second Amendment in HistoricalPerspective, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 195, 235 (2000); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 462-64 (1995).
9. Dorf, supra n. 8, at 293-94; Finkelman, supra n. 8, at 235; David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 588,
613-14 (2000).
10. Yassky, supra n. 9, at 613-14.
11. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 207-08 (1983).
12. Anthony J. Dennis, Clearingthe Smoke from the Right to BearArms and the Second
Amendment, 29 Akron L. Rev. 57, 68-69 (1995).
13. Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 889, 891 (2001) (examining the individualist and collectivist
theories and surmising "[bloth readings are wrong"). Some have contended this issue is
driven purely by the belief system of the arbiter and not by constitutional theory or interpretation. One commentator notes, "[t]he choice is going to depend on the ideology of the
interpreter." Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Address: Putting the Gun Control Debate in Social Perspective, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 477, 481 (2004).
14. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The TerrifyingSecond Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 551, 554 (1991) (arguing the Second Amendment guaranteed the right of a virtuous and universal citizen militia to keep and bear arms, but today's
gun owners do not fit this description).
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ual right" model. 15 Under this theory, the Second Amendment
guarantees an individual right to arms if the gun is related to par16
ticipation in a militia.
This debate is not merely an academic exercise. Courts routinely parse legal scholarship to gain insight into Second Amendment theories and to bolster their decisions. 1 7 The interpretations
disseminated by commentators have driven a discourse devoid of
modern-day Supreme Court contributions.
B.

The United States Supreme Court and the
Second Amendment

The Supreme Court's interactions with the Second Amendment are sparse.18 The Court has never explicitly incorporated
the right to keep and bear arms into the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9 This scenario is the product of two nineteenth-century
cases which held the Amendment was a limitation only upon the
federal government. 20 The Supreme Court directly addressed the
Amendment only once in the twentieth century. The Court's 1939
decision in United States v. Miller is the last time it considered a
Second Amendment challenge. 2 ' In Miller, authorities charged
two men with illegally transporting a shotgun having a barrel less
22
than eighteen inches, in violation of the National Firearms Act.
The district court held that the law violated the Second Amendment. 23 The Supreme Court reversed. Offering scant rationale,
15. Robert Hardaway, Elizabeth Gormley & Bryan Taylor, The Inconvenient Militia
Clause of the Second Amendment: Why the Supreme Court Declines to Resolve the Debate
over the Right to Bear Arms, 16 St. John's J. Leg. Comment. 41, 56 (2002).
16. Id. at 56-57.
17. See Parkerv. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052
(9th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
18. But see David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What
the Supreme Court Has Said about the Second Amendment, 18 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 99
(1999) (surveying 35 cases in which the Supreme Court addressed the Second Amendment).
19. Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637, 652-53
(1989).
20. Presserv. Ill., 116 U.S. 252, 664-65 (1886) (holding the right to own and carry guns
does not include the right to carry guns in public as part of a group on a military parade);
U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (holding the Second Amendment "is one of the
amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any violation by their fellowcitizens of the rights it recognizes," to police powers). See also David B. Kopel, The Second
Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 1359, 1459 (1998).
21. U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
22. Id. at 175; The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801 et seq. (I.R.C. 1939).
23. Miller, 307 U.S. at 177.
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the Court stated that since there was no evidence the shotgun had
"some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
24
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument."
Miller's brusque analysis could be attributed to the defendants' failure to present an argument. 25 The defendants' position
was never briefed, suggesting the Court did not have a complete
record. 26 Nevertheless, the Court held the defendants could be
convicted because they presented no evidence the shotgun had
"some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia."2 7 Because the record did not indicate
whether such a gun was an ordinary military weapon, the Court
remanded the case for fact-finding. 28 One Second Amendment authority concluded "while Miller held that the 'arms' protected by
the Second Amendment are arms suitable for militia use, it did
not question that the right is held by the individual." 2 9 Despite
the Court's truncated analysis, Miller has been invoked to reject
an individual right to keep and bear arms.
C.

Federal Circuit Courts and the Second Amendment

The Supreme Court's reluctance to expound on Miller specifically, or the Second Amendment generally, has left the lower
courts to their own devices. The individual right interpretation
has not fared well in federal appellate courts until recently.
Under the auspices of Miller, courts have determined the right to
keep and bear arms extends only to state militias. The following
excerpts from federal circuit cases capture the collectivist legacy
spawned by Miller.
24. Id. at 178.
25. U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2001). In lieu of a brief, counsel for
the Miller defendants sent a telegram to the Court "[s]uggest[ing] case be submitted on
[Government's] Brief." Stephen P. Halbrook, The Second Amendment in the Supreme
Court: Where It's Been and Where It's Going, 29 Hamline L. Rev. 449, 449 (2006).
26. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, PoliticalLiberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 103, 109 (1987) (citing lack of evidence, defendant's failure to
present an argument, and defendant's disappearance following trial court's dismissal of
their indictment as contributing to defendant's loss); Robert Dowlut, Federal and State
Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. Dayton L. Rev. 59, 73-74 (1989) (arguing that
Miller was defective due to the one-sided participation).
27. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
28. Id. at 183.
29. Halbrook, supra n. 25, at 454.
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The First Circuit stated, "the federal government can limit
the keeping and bearing of arms by a single individual." 30 The
Third Circuit held the Second Amendment was "a protection for
the States in the maintenance of their militia organizations
against possible encroachments by the federal power." 3 1 In Love
v. Pepersack, the Fourth Circuit determined the Second Amendment "does not confer an absolute individual right to bear any
type of firearm." 32 The Sixth Circuit held the Second Amendment
right applies only to state militias, stating "there can be no serious
claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm." 33 In Quilici v. Morton Grove, the Seventh Circuit
ruled "possession of handguns by individuals is not part of the
right to keep and bear arms." 34 The Eighth Circuit found no "fundamental right to keep and bear arms in ... [the Second] amendment."3 5 In Hickman v. Block, the Ninth Circuit ruled the right to
keep and bear arms is held by the states, not citizens. 3 6 In the
Tenth Circuit, the right to keep and bear arms does not encompass the right to possess a weapon.3 7 Finally, in United States v.
Wright, the Eleventh Circuit held the expression "well regulated
militia" referred "only to governmental militias that are actively
maintained and used for the common defense." 38 These cases left
no doubt as to where the federal courts of appeals stood.
At this juncture, an individual right to keep and bear arms
was a dead letter. Every circuit entertaining the question rejected
the individual right position. In 2001, the seminal case of United
States v. Emerson upset this placid state. 39 Emerson involved a
challenge to a law prohibiting individuals subject to a restraining
30. Cases v. U.S., 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942). However, the First Circuit did
caution that the government "cannot prohibit the possession or use of any weapon which
has any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia." Id.
31. U.S. v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942).
32. Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995).
33. Stevens v. U.S., 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971). The Sixth Circuit recently revisited the issue in U.S. v. Napier, where it found no reason to depart from its precedent that
the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual right to bear arms. U.S. v.
Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 403 (6th Cir. 2000).
34. Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 1982).
35. U.S. v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988).
36. Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996).
37. U.S. v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977).
38. U.S. v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 1997). While the Second Circuit has
not explicitly ruled on the issue, it has noted gun possession is not a fundamental right.
U.S. v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
39. U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
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order from carrying a handgun. 40 While the Fifth Circuit upheld
the law, it was the court's Second Amendment pronouncements
that made headlines. 4 1 The Emerson court reasoned that the
word "people" used in the Second Amendment was no different
from the other amendments, and thus it denoted individuals, not
state governments. 42 The Fifth Circuit held the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual's right to keep and bear arms.4 3 A
shock to the system, Emerson resuscitated a constitutional right
that had been on life support.
The Fifth Circuit's expansive reading was given a mixed reception by its sister circuits. 44 In the 2002 case Silveira v.
Lockyer, the Ninth Circuit upheld a California state ban on assault weapons, basing its holding on a previous Ninth Circuit decision, Hickman v. Block. 45 Despite the settled nature of the Second
Amendment in the Ninth Circuit, the Silveira court felt compelled
to justify its stance in light of Emerson. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the Amendment conferred only a collective right, concluding it "was adopted in order to protect the people from the threat
of federal tyranny by preserving the right of the states to arm

their militias. "46
A year after the Ninth Circuit decided Silveira, it entertained
47
a challenge to a law prohibiting gun shows in Nordyke v. King.
Rejecting the challenge, the court followed Silveira in ruling that
the Second Amendment protected only a collective right. 48 However, the Nordyke panel expressed discomfort with the analysis
and holding of Silveira and noted that, if not bound by precedent,
40. Id. at 211-12.
41. Lyle Denniston, Individuals Have Gun Rights, Court Says Long-Awaited Case Departs from Long Practice in the US, Boston Globe A5 (Oct. 17, 2001); William Yelverton,
The Shot Heard around the U.S.A., Tampa Trib. 2 (Oct. 21, 2001).
42. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227-28.
43. Id. at 264-65.
44. The Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have considered appeals which sought to
follow the holding of Emerson. See e.g. U.S. v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2006); U.S.
v. Parker,362 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Price, 328 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2003). In all
three instances, the challenges were brought by criminal defendants and rejected by the
courts, which declined to consider adopting Emerson. In none of the situations did the
court lament or laud the Fifth Circuit's ruling.
45. Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2002); Hickman v. Block, 81
F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996). For an analysis ofSilveira v. Lockyer, see Roy Lucas, From Patsone
& Miller to Silveira v. Lockyer: To Keep and Bear Arms, 26 Thomas Jefferson L. Rev.
257 (2004).
46. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1086-87.
47. Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2003).
48. Id. at 1191-92.
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it "may be inclined to follow the approach of the Fifth Circuit in
Emerson."4 9 This veiled support notwithstanding, the Fifth Circuit stood alone until the D.C. Circuit stepped into the fray and
addressed the constitutionality of the Washington, D.C. gun regulation.
D.

The District of Columbia's Firearm Ordinance

The United States Congress passed the Home Rule Act in
1973, granting the District of Columbia greater self-determination. 50 Home Rule proved a catalyst for extensive gun regulation.
In 1976, the Council of the District of Columbia considered a bill
restricting city residents from possessing handguns. 5 1 The impetus was the proliferation of gun-related deaths; experts testified to
the Council that in 1974, handguns were used in 155 of 285
murders in the District of Columbia. 5 2 In 1975, handguns were
used in 695 aggravated assaults, 3,405 robberies, and 133
53
murders.
These figures prompted the D.C. Council to enact the most
far-reaching regulatory scheme in the nation. The District requires all firearms to be registered. However, this registration requirement is a facade vis-A-vis handguns, as the District prohibits
registration certificates for handguns not registered before September 24, 1976. 54 Those firearms that are licensed are subject to
additional restrictions. Each firearm must be "unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock." 55 The District further prohibits moving lawfully-owned handguns within one's own home

49. Id. at 1191.
50. Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973).
51. Meg Smith, A History of Gun Control, Wash. Post C4 (Mar. 11, 2007).
52. See Katharine E. Kohm, Parker v. D.C.: Putting the "I's"in Militia, 42 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 807, 815 n. 39 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
53. Id.
54. D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (West 2007) ("A registration certificate shall not be issued for a: ... (4) Pistol not validly registered to the current registrant in the District prior
to September 24, 1976."); Id. at § 7-2501.01(12) (" 'Pistol' means any firearm originally designed to be fired by use of a single hand.").
55. Id. at § 7-2507.02 (stating that "each registrant shall keep any firearm in his possession unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device unless such
firearm is kept at his place of business, or while being used for lawful recreational purposes
within the District of Columbia").
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without a permit. 5 6 While not challenged by the plaintiffs in
57
Parker,the District also proscribes carrying firearms in public.
Violations of these provisions are punishable by a $1,000 fine,
one year's imprisonment, or both. 58 A second offense carries a
$5,000 fine, five years' imprisonment, or both. 59 The District
strictly enforces these provisions. The city has charged victims of
home invasions who used guns in self-defense for violating fire60
arm regulations.
E.

Parker v. District of Columbia

The provisions enacted in 1976 remained unaltered when six
individuals brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the District
of Columbia in February of 2003.61 The plaintiffs included George
Lyon who wanted a gun in his home because "[g]uns are a tool,
and they have a use. The use is protection and security. '6 2 Plaintiff Shelly Parker sought a gun to ward off neighborhood drug
dealers angered by her anti-drug activism.6 3 Plaintiff Dick Heller
carried a handgun while on duty as a District of Columbia Special
Police Officer guarding the Federal Judicial Center. 64 But when
he applied for a registration certificate to own a handgun, the Dis65
trict denied his request.
The plaintiffs' twenty-four-paragraph complaint alleged the
District of Columbia infringed on their right to possess a personal
firearm in their home, as guaranteed by the Second Amend56. Id. at § 22-4504.
57. Id. at §§ 22-4504, -4515. ("No person shall carry within the District of Columbia
either openly or concealed on or about their person, a pistol, without a license issued pursuant to District of Columbia law."); Id. at § 22-4515 ("Any violation of any provision of this
chapter for which no penalty is specifically provided shall be punished by a fine of not more
than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both.").
58. Id. at § 7-2507.06.
59. Id. at § 7-2507.06(2)(A).
60. Appellant's Br. at 60, Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (available at
Two examhttp://www.gurapossessky.comnews/parker/documents/appellantsbrief.pdf).
ples of such prosecutions are described in the following articles: Barton Gellman, Rowan
Gun Case in Jury's Hands, Wash. Post D1 (Sept. 29, 1988); Jim Keary, Intruder Shot in
Home on Hill; Residence Had Been Burglarized Last Week, Wash. Times C9 (Feb. 5, 1997).
61. PI.'s Compl., Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (available at http:/l
www.gurapossessky.comnews/parker/documents/complaint.pdf).
62. Elissa Silverman & Allison Klein, PlaintiffsReflect on Gun Ruling; Residents Suing
D.C. Explain Motivation, Wash. Post C1 (Mar. 11, 2007).
63. Id.
64. Appellant's Br. at 4-5, Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (available at
http://www.gurapossessky.com/news/parker/documents/appellantsbrief.pdf).
65. Id.
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ment. 66 The plaintiffs took aim at the aforementioned provisions
of the D.C. Code pertaining to the licensing, storing, and transporting of firearms. 67 The plaintiffs averred that the city's enforcement of laws banning the "possession of handguns and functional firearms within the home, forbidding otherwise lawful selfdefense usage of arms, and forbidding the movement of a handgun
on an individual's property," violated their Second Amendment
rights. 68 The District filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the Second Amendment conferred no individual right to possess a firearm.

1.

69

The District Court's Decision

Finding that Dick Heller had standing to challenge the regulations because the District denied him a permit, the D.C. District
Court began its Second Amendment analysis with United States v.
Miller.70 The district court seized on the Supreme Court's reticence post-Miller.71 It inferred the Supreme Court's refusal to address the federal courts of appeals' collective right reading as tacit
approval. 7 2 The district court cited Seegars v. Ashcroft, another
D.C. District Court decision issued two months earlier which dis73
missed a similar challenge to the District's firearm regulations.
Seegars rejected the individual right theory and concluded "the
District of Columbia is not a state within the meaning of the Second Amendment and therefore the Second Amendment's reach
does not extend to it." 74 After invoking Seegars, the Parkercourt
confronted the Fifth Circuit's decision in Emerson. The court eschewed the merits of Emerson, and instead addressed the Emerson court's purported failure to adhere to Fifth Circuit precedent. 7 5 The district court claimed it did not "place a great deal of
reliance on the stability of Emerson even within the Fifth Cir66. Pl.'s Compl. at 4, Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (available at http://
www.gurapossessky.com/news/parker/documents/complaint.pdf).
67. Id. at 5-6.
68. Id. at 7.
69. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 5, Parkerv. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (available at
http://www.gurapossessky.com/news/parker/documents/DefsMotiontoDismissBrief.pdf).
70. Parkerv.D.C., 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 104 (D.D.C. 2004).
71. Id. at 105.
72. Id.
73. Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2004).
74. Id. at 239. The D.C. Circuit later affirmed Seegars, holding that the litigants were
not threatened with criminal prosecution and thus lacked standing. Seegars v. Ashcroft,
396 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
75. Parker, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
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However, the district court did not acknowledge the Fifth

77
Circuit's denial of a petition for rehearing en banc in Emerson.
The district court found additional guidance from the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals, which held "the Second Amend78
ment guarantees a collective rather than an individual right."
While the D.C. Court of Appeals had interpreted the Second
Amendment, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit had not. The district court noted the D.C. Circuit upheld a statute prohibiting domestic violence offenders from
possessing a gun in FraternalOrder of Police v. U.S. 7 9 However,
the D.C. Circuit declined to address the Second Amendment's
scope because there was no evidence showing a relationship between the plaintiffs' gun possession and the preservation of a militia.8 0 Based on Fraternal Order of Police, the district court reasoned "the D.C. Circuit is likely to reject the notion that the Sec81
ond Amendment guarantees an individual's right to bear arms."
The district court found no individual right to keep and bear arms
separate from service in the militia, and because the plaintiffs did
not assert membership in the militia, granted the motion to dismiss.8 2

2.

The Court of Appeals Decision

The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision, arguing
the District's ordinance banned the possession of functional firearms within their homes.8 3 The thrust of their appeal was the
Supreme Court's treatment of the phrase "the people," as articulated in the Bill of Rights. The appellants highlighted the Court's
refusal to distinguish between "the people" of the Second Amendment and "the people" of the other amendments.8 4 They argued
76. Id. at 107-08.
77. U.S. v. Emerson, 281 F.3d 1281 (5th Cir. 2001) (denying the petition for rehearing
en banc).
78. Sandidge v. U.S., 520 A.2d 1057, 1058 (D.C. App. 1987) (quoting U.S. v. Warin, 530
F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976)).
79. Parker, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 108 (citing FraternalOr. of Police v. U.S., 173 F.3d 898,
906 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
80. FraternalOr. of Police, 173 F.3d at 906.
81. Parker, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 108.
82. Id. at 109.
83. Appellants' Br. at 16, Parkerv.D.C., 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004) (emphasis
in original). The D.C. Circuit would later define "functional firearms" as guns "readily accessible when necessary for self defense in the home." Parker,478 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
84. Appellants' Br. at 27, Parker v. D.C., 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004).
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that history, case law, and the Amendment's text support the individual right reading.
The District countered that its ordinance did not ban firearms, but merely prohibited "a narrow type of weaponry."8' 5 Moreover, handguns were not integral to militia service, and such guns
had a propensity for being used in criminal activities.8 6 The District's textual analysis emphasized the militaristic overtones of
the Second Amendment as confirmation of the collective right interpretation. Not until the waning paragraphs of its brief did the
District argue its non-state status rendered the Second Amend87
ment inapplicable.
A divided D.C. Circuit struck down the regulations.8 8 The
D.C. Circuit began its opinion with the determination that Heller
had standing to challenge the ordinance because the denial of his
registration certificate constituted an injury-in-fact.8 9 Moving to
the merits, the court described the District's position "to be that
the Second Amendment is a dead letter."90 This summarization
was not an exaggeration, as the city contended at oral argument
that it could legally ban all firearms outright. 9 1 The court examined the varying interpretations of the Second Amendment, including state appellate courts' readings of the Amendment, which
the court felt "offer[ed] a more balanced picture." 9 2 Determining
circuit and Supreme Court case law was devoid of definitive guidance, the D.C. Circuit began its dissection of the Second Amend93
ment.
Contrary to the District's affinity for the phrase "bear arms,"
the court found "the people" most dispositive. 9 4 Using the deceptively simple but doctrinally sound reading that "the people" used
in the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments referred to
85. Appellees' Br. at 12, Parker v. D.C., 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004) (internal
quotes omitted).
86. Id. at 15-16. While remarking the plaintiffs' policy arguments were "addressed to
the wrong forum," the District did not hesitate to devote a few pages of its brief to the
subject of gun violence.
87. Id. at 38.
88. Parker, 478 F.3d at 396, petition for rehearing en banc denied, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11029. The opinion noted that Circuit Judges Randolph, Rogers, Tatel, and Garland would grant the petition. Id.
89. Parker,478 F.3d at 376.
90. Id. at 378.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 380.
93. Id. at 380-81.
94. Id. at 381.
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individual rights, the court discerned no reason why the Second
Amendment should be different. For support, the D.C. Circuit
95
cited a Supreme Court decision, U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez. In
Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court noted "the people" protected by the
First, Second, and Fourth Amendments "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered
part of that community." 96 This language convinced the D.C. Cirproteccuit that the Second Amendment guaranteed individual
97
tions indistinguishable from other amendments.
Finding an individual right to keep and bear arms, the court
made its second critical determination. The court resolved "the
right to keep and bear arms was not created by government, but

rather preserved by

it."98

The court articulated the basis of this

right as twofold: private purposes such as self-defense and hunting and the public purpose of militia service. 9 9
After making these determinations, the court responded to
the District's reading of the Second Amendment's operative
clause. Admitting the phrase "bear arms" had a militaristic connotation, the court pointed to a number of examples of its use in
non-military contexts. 10 0 The court further objected to the District's Second Amendment interpretation because "the plain
meaning of 'keep' strikes a mortal blow to the collective right theory." 10 1 The court's elevation of the individualistic components of
its interpretathe Amendment, "the people" and "keep," pervaded
10 2
holding.
ultimate
its
foreshadowed
tion and
Turning to the Amendment's prefatory clause, the court highlighted the parties' divergent understanding of "a well regulated
Militia."1 0 3 The appellants envisioned a loosely formed, ad hoc
group while the District regarded the militia as a well-organized
and regimented fighting force. 10 4 The court likened the militia's
rudimentary enrollment requirements to the current Selective
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Parker,478 F.3d at 381 (citing U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)).
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
Parker,478 F.3d at 382.
Id.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 384-85.
Id. at 386.
Id.
Parker,478 F.3d at 386.
Id.
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Service Act.10 5 The court concluded "a well regulated Militia" was
not a select group of men, but a majority of the general male popu10 6
lation.
Establishing the foundation for its individual right interpretation, the court addressed the import of U.S. v. Miller.1 0 7 Following the Fifth Circuit in Emerson, the D.C. Circuit emphasized the
Miller Court's implicit refusal to adopt the government's collective
right theory. 108 The court concluded that Miller supported the individual right interpretation, 10 9 reasoning that if the Miller Court
endorsed the collective right reading, it would have highlighted
the defendants' lack of militia affiliation. 11 0
In summary, the D.C. Circuit read the Second Amendment as
standing for two propositions.'
The right to keep and bear arms
has individual and civic justifications. The individual basis encompasses one's right to keep arms for self-defense and hunting.
The civic or collective rationale entails responsibilities relating to
the militia. Through this prism, the D.C. Circuit struck the challenged provisions as violating the Second Amendment.1 12
The court's application of the Second Amendment to the restrictions was anticlimactic. In finding the three provisions unconstitutional, the court disposed of each with a single paragraph.
Section 7-2502.02(a)(4) of the D.C. Code was unconstitutional because handguns fell under the rubric of "arms" as referenced in
the Second Amendment, and thus the District could not ban
them.1 13 Contravening the District's argument that handguns
furthered criminality, the court noted that handguns were the
preferred firearm "for protection of one's home and family." 1 4
The court was similarly succinct in discarding the ban on moving
registered handguns within one's home. Invalidating § 22-4504,
the court reasoned that "[s]uch a restriction would negate the lawful use upon which the [Second Amendment] was premised-i.e.,
105. Id. at 387 (citing The Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 453 (West 1990)
(mandating that all American males register upon reaching the age of 18 as a contingency
should the draft be reintroduced)).
106. Id. at 389.
107. U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
108. U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 225 (5th Cir. 2001).
109. Parker,478 F.3d at 394.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 395.
112. Id. at 399-401.
113. Id. at 400.
114. Id.
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self-defense." 115 The court again relied on the self-defense justification to strike down § 7-2507.02, which mandated that a firearm
be kept unloaded and disassembled or locked. Because this requirement "amounts to a complete prohibition" on116using a gun for
self-defense, it violated the Second Amendment.
The court's decision provoked a dissenting opinion by Judge
Henderson. She disputed the propriety of entertaining the appellants' challenge, calling the Second Amendment's meaning in the
District of Columbia "purely academic."' 17 Citing the district
court's decision in Seegars v. Ashcroft, the dissent proclaimed the
District was not a State for Second Amendment purposes "and
therefore the Second Amendment's reach does not extend to it."118
The dissent found support in U.S. v. Miller, reading it to provide
the Second Amendment "relates to those Militia whose continued
vitality is required to safeguard the individual States."" 9 Other
than this reliance on Miller to argue the Second Amendment only
implicated States, the dissent refused to challenge the majority's
individual right interpretation.
III. AN

ASSESSMENT OF PARKER V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The Second Amendment guarantees a profound right with inherent responsibilities. Like any other right, it is subject to reasonable restrictions. But leaving the Second Amendment to the
whims of politicians motivated more by political polls than constitutional considerations places it in a vulnerable position. The
Washington, D.C. firearm ordinance reflects this reality as the
Second Amendment has been in abeyance in the District since the
Bicentennial.
The ordinance challenged in Parker is not a regulation, a restriction, or an inhibition. It is a ban that tramples over the Second Amendment rights of the District's residents. The ordinance
is inimical to the Constitution and the beliefs espoused by its authors. Its blatancy is no less transparent than a law prohibiting
speech critical of the government. The requirement that firearms
be kept unloaded and disassembled renders self-defense even in
one's home a nullity. Prohibiting the transfer of a gun between
rooms in a home is the height of intrusiveness. The District's
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Parker,478 F.3d at 400.
Id. at 401.
Id.
Id. at 401-02 (quoting Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201, 239 (D.D.C. 2004)).
Id. at 403-04.
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scheme leaves its law-abiding citizens nothing more than "second
class citizens." 120 Parker eradicates this stigma. The D.C. Circuit's reading is a straightforward interpretation that infuses a
desperately needed dose of common sense into the Second Amendment debate.
A.

The Majority Opinion in Parker v. District of Columbia

The majority's view of the District's ordinance was colored by
the extreme position embraced by the District at oral argument.
The District contended it had an unobstructed right to regulate
firearms, including outlawing them. That the Second Amendment
was, in the District's eyes, "a dead letter," may have doomed its
prospects.
The D.C. Circuit exposed the collective right reading for its
amendment-eviscerating tendencies. Stripped to its essentials,
the collective right theory provides that the militia's obsolescence
obviates any constitutional protections. In other words, the Second Amendment guarantees rights relating only to militias, but
since such institutions are defunct, the Second Amendment is an
anachronism that protects no rights in modern day America. The
court found this outcome disturbing. The court's concern with the
practical consequences of endorsing the collective right reading
was justified. The underlying message of the collective right interpretation is subtle but unmistakable: the people cannot be
trusted with the right to possess a gun. The collectivist notion
further undermines the noble purpose of the Second Amendment,
which charges individuals with the duty to defend themselves and
their country. The D.C. Circuit understood that if the right to
bear arms as a militia member in defense of a public force is permitted, it should encompass the right to keep arms as an individual in self-defense against a private force. Arms for personal defense are a natural corollary of arms for a public defense.
1. Recognizing the Evolution of the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms
Parker'srationale takes a page from the "living Constitution"
framework. This is logical, as the Second Amendment discussion
parallels the living Constitution debate. The living Constitution
120. Stephen Halbrook, Second Class Citizenship and the Second Amendment in the District of Columbia, 5 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rights L.J. 105, 106 (1995).
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theory posits that the Constitution is a malleable document sub12 1 If
ject to reinterpretation as times change and society evolves.
one accepts the Constitution as living and evolving, then the collective right theory is of negligible worth. There is no dispute the
state militia is non-existent today. However, the basis for militias-defending against aggression-is still relevant.
The living Constitution theory would acknowledge this critical function is effectuated not by militias, but by the widespread
ownership of firearms. Millions of Americans rely on firearms to
defend themselves and their families. This evolution establishes
that the collective right reading is outmoded because it relies on a
relic to the disregard of current societal norms. Thus, under the
living Constitution approach, individual gun ownership furthers
the right of self-defense and the maintenance of a free State. The
obsolescence of militias coupled with the predominance of firearms used for self-defense warrants this result. Viewing the collective right interpretation through a living Constitution lens
leads to the inescapable conclusion that such an incongruous reading does not comport with modern day realities. While the D.C.
Circuit did not apply the living Constitution theory, the court's
reasoning contains traces of this framework.
Expansive constitutional readings have become de rigueur.
Courts have extended the First and Fourth Amendments to protect mediums and venues inconceivable in colonial times. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to encompass guarantees like "liberty of the person both in its spatial and
more transcendent dimensions" that are amorphous in scope and
untraceable in origin. 12 2 Given this progression, the Second
Amendment should be evaluated in a similar vein. The collective
right theory is a retrograde reading because it suffers from the
dual defects of contracting individual rights and ignoring the
evolution of society. The D.C. Circuit's Second Amendment interpretation recognized the collective right reading's shortcomings
and reflected the evolution of firearm rights.
2.

Considering the States' Treatment of FirearmRights

Unlike most federal appellate courts, the D.C. Circuit identified state appellate courts endorsing the individual right read121. Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the "Living Constitution", 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1456, 1463 (2001).
122. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
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ing. 123 In sharp contrast to the near-unanimous approach of federal courts, seven state appellate courts endorse the individual
12 4
right reading while ten follow the collective right approach.
The recognition of state courts' treatment of the right to keep and
bear arms only scratches the surface. As the following section sets
forth, the vast majority of state constitutions provide for an individual right to possess a firearm. 12 5 Furthermore, the legislative
trends of the States favor an expansive reading of individual firearm rights. 12 6 The D.C. Circuit hinted that the federal courts' refusal to recognize individual gun rights is not universally embraced. Greater scrutiny would uncover how isolated the federal
courts are. While the D.C. Circuit refrained from addressing the
national consensus concerning the right to keep and bear arms,
the Supreme Court might not.
3.

D.C. Circuit's Evaluation of Supreme Court Precedent

The only foible of the D.C. Circuit's opinion is the conclusory
fashion in which the court asserted "no direct precedent [in] the
Supreme Court... provides us with a square holding on the question . . ",127 These words were belied by the court's analysis, as
Miller was the D.C. Circuit's focal point. However, while the court
devoted substantial attention to the opaque, but no less binding
Miller, it was distilled through an informative rather than authoritative vein. Even if the Supreme Court admits the dissension
generated by Miller is justified, it might rebuke the D.C. Circuit
for demoting its decision.
The Parker court's treatment of Miller is understandable.
Miller offers a Second Amendment starting point, but little else.
Miller's terse opinion borrows more than it offers. Moreover, the
backgrounds of Miller and Parker are dissimilar. While the D.C.
Circuit did not raise this point, it bears noting that the Miller
Court faced a Second Amendment challenge by criminal defendants. Additionally, the regulation in Miller was just that. The underlying law restricted only transporting certain types of guns. In
sharp contrast, Parker involves a ban on possessing a functional
firearm in one's home. Thus, the federal statute challenged in
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Parker,478 F.3d at 406.
Id. at 380, n. 6.
See infra nn. 157-84 and accompanying text.
Id.
Parker,478 F.3d at 380-81.
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Miller is worlds away from the D.C. ordinance. These factual and
legal distinctions cannot be swept aside.
Miller was not the only Supreme Court decision considered by
the Parker court. The D.C. Circuit found guidance in the Court's
pronouncement from U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez12 that "the people" referenced in the Second Amendment were indistinguishable
from "the people" depicted in the First and Fourth Amendments. 129 While the Supreme Court admitted its "textual exegesis
is by no means conclusive,"' 130 it is difficult to conclude the D.C.
Circuit's reliance was misplaced. If the Drafters intended the militia to be a special subset of individuals, it could have articulated
these sentiments. However, as with the other amendments, they
used the general term "the people." Such a reality renders a sui
generis reading of the Second Amendment harder to sustain. The
D.C. Circuit acknowledged this: "The Second Amendment would
be an inexplicable aberration if it were not read to protect individual rights as well." 131 The D.C. Circuit's contention that "the people" described in the Bill of Rights should be read consistently is
an island of analytical simplicity in a sea of constitutional complexities.
4.

Applying the Natural Rights Theory to the Debate

The D.C. Circuit made another significant conclusion in its
Second Amendment interpretation. Treading on the periphery of
natural rights, the court stated the "the right to keep and bear
arms was not created by the government, but rather preserved by
it."132

Commentators often recite the numerous firearm restric-

tions enacted throughout English history and during the colonial
period. While these examples challenge the notion that colonists
had an unencumbered right to possess a firearm, their force is diminished when the natural right theory is raised. For these
prohibitions do not alter the axiom that individuals have a natural
right to keep arms for self-defense. Once the D.C. Circuit enunciated this reading, arguments invoking the historical precedent for
gun restrictions lost their strength.
The D.C. Circuit's pre-existing right theory has an inherent
appeal. Blackstone articulated the English right to arms as an
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
Parker,478 F.3d at 381 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265).
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
Parker, 478 F.3d at 382.
Id. at 390.
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"auxiliary" one needed "to protect and maintain inviolate the
three great and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private property."13 3 Man's yearning to defend himself,
his home, and his freedom is no less palpable today. The right to
protect oneself, whether against a street criminal or tyrannical
government, is preserved in the scheme of ordered liberty. These
are basic individual concerns that transcend any collectivist abstraction. The founders recognized this innate desire and transcribed it in the Bill of Rights. The D.C. Circuit's pre-existing
right theory respects these principles.
Parsing the grammar of the Second Amendment does not alter the fact that firearms were a fixture of early America. Firearms served the function of feeding and protecting families. The
right to possess arms was assumed for sport, hunting, and selfdefense, in addition to militia duties. This picture coincides with
the Parkercourt's holding that the right to keep and bear arms is
a pre-existing right. An explicit right to use a gun to protect one's
family was unnecessary because this was a natural, inherent right
enjoyed by the people. As one commentator notes, "the most plausible reason for such silence is that the right to use private arms
for personal self-defense was simply taken for granted by the
Framers." 1 34 Reading the Second Amendment to prohibit people
from keeping firearms in their homes is counterintuitive to the
principles of liberty and limited government held by the Framers.
Parker ameliorated this transgression.
B.

The Dissenting Opinion in Parker v. District of Columbia

A dissent that chastises the majority for being too thorough is
a rare occurrence. Yet this is how the Parker dissent opens: "exhaustive opinions on the origin, purpose, and scope of the Second
Amendment . . . have proven irresistible to the federal judiciary."13 5 The dissent's fascination with the longevity and history of
the majority's opinion as a detriment is noteworthy. The majority's elaboration adds to, rather than detracts from, the strength
of the opinion.
133. William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 1, **136-39 (Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish Publg. Ltd.).
134. Jerry Bonanno, Facingthe Lion in the Bush: Exploring the Implications of Adopting
an Individual Rights Interpretationof the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, 29 Hamline L. Rev. 463, 478 (2006).
135. Parker,478 F.3d at 401 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
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The Parker dissent is notable not for what it says, but for
what it does not. The dissent avoids the threshold issue presented
by the case, as the singular focus of the dissent is the District's
non-state status. Thus, exchange between the dissent and the
majority is negligible. The dissent's premise is straightforward:
because the District is not a state within the meaning of the Second Amendment, it forecloses any analysis of what the right to
keep and bear arms entails. Instead of addressing the majority's
Second Amendment interpretation, the dissent places all of its
eggs in the federal district basket. The dissent's focus is remarkable given the low priority the District afforded the issue. The District did not raise the Amendment's inapplicability until the waning paragraphs of its brief. The District's perfunctory analysis of
the issue further accentuates the lack of confidence it had in this
argument.
U.S. v. Miller 136 is the basis for the dissent's reading that the
Second Amendment does not encompass the District. 13 7 The dissent notes that Miller emphasizes "the declaration and guarantee
of the Second Amendment . . . must be interpreted and applied
together." 138 The dissent uses this reading to conclude the individual component cannot be isolated or elevated, and thus the
Amendment's "character and aim do not require that we treat the
District as a State. 1 3 9
In holding the Second Amendment is inapplicable to the District of Columbia, the dissent adopts an outdated position. The
Supreme Court has ruled on the applicability of the Bill of Rights
to the District. In Callan v. Wilson, the Court held that the constitutional protections enshrined in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were "secured for the benefit of all the people of the United
States, as well as those permanently or temporarily residing in
the District of Columbia as those residing or being in the several
states."140 The Court found nothing "to justify the assertion that
the people of this District may be lawfully deprived of the benefit
of any of the constitutional guaranties of life, liberty, and property. 141 In Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court upheld the application of
due process principles to District residents. 142 Noting that States
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
Id.
Parker,478 F.3d at 402 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).
Id. at 406 (internal citations omitted).
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1888).
Id. at 550.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
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were prohibited from maintaining segregated public schools, the
Bolling Court reasoned, "it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government." 143 The Court again echoed these sentiments in Pernell v.
Southall Realty, where it held "like other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, [the Seventh Amendment] is fully applicable to courts established by Congress in the District of Columbia. ' 144
The dissent eschews these lessons and instead seizes on distinctions between the District and the States that have no import
on the Second Amendment. The dissent's reliance on Adams v.
Clinton 4 5 embodies this point.' 46 In Adams, the Supreme Court
affirmed the D.C. Circuit's holding that the Constitution did not
guarantee District citizens the right to vote for members of Congress because the District did not constitute a "State" within the
Constitution's voting clauses. 147 The concerns implicated in Adams did not turn on individual rights, but the complexities of the
District's unique status and the voting issues inherent in such intricacies. The question raised in Adams went to the heart of the
District's origins and purpose. In contrast, the Second Amendment encapsulates an individual guarantee overriding any statedistrict distinction.
Similarly, the dissent's dependence on Lee v. Flintkote and
LaShawn v. Barry does not carry the day.' 48 In Lee, the D.C. Circuit held "the District, unlike the states, has no reserved power to
be guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment."1 4 9 In LaShawn, the
D.C. Circuit held the Eleventh Amendment had no application to
the District. 150 The rights at stake in these two cases did not involve individual guarantees set forth in the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, or Sixth Amendments. Thus, the case law cited by the dissent fosters the illusion that individual protections are in abeyance in the District. The dissent's reliance on cases concerning
voting rights, the Tenth Amendment, and the Eleventh Amendment is a narrow reed upon which to base the contention that an
individual right has no application in the District.
143. Id.
144. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 370 (1974).
145. Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2000), affd, 531 U.S. 941 (2000).
146. Parkerv. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
147. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
148. Parker,478 F.3d at 406; Lee v. Flintkote, 593 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1979); LaShawn
v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
149. Lee, 593 F.2d at 1278.
150. LaShawn, 87 F.3d at 1397-98.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2008

23

Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 3

136

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 69

The dissent's position is further weakened by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals' refusal to rely on the District's status
to reject Second Amendment challenges. In Sandidge v. U.S., the
D.C. Court of Appeals held the Second Amendment protects the
right of the state to bear arms, not the individual. 15 1 The court
did not address whether the District's non-state status rendered
the Amendment inapplicable. 15 2 The court reaffirmed Sandidge
in the 2003 decision of Barron v. U.S.153 Thus, the dissent's novel
proposition that the District is beyond the reach of the Second
Amendment has not been embraced by the D.C. Court of Appeals.
The dissent's anachronistic reading that provisions of the Bill
of Rights are inapplicable to the District is a microcosm of the collective right approach. The collective right theory stands the idea
of expanding constitutional protections on its head. Condensed
readings of constitutional guarantees fell out of favor. Constitutional rights have undergone extensive evolution and their reach
has seen significant dilation in recent years. A Second Amendment interpretation should expand rather than contract individual rights. The rhetoric of the collective right reading does not
reflect the reality of modern constitutional jurisprudence. The
dissent suffers from this same failing.
One cannot ignore the Supreme Court's post-1950s expansive
view of Constitutional rights. As Judge Alex Kozinski admonished in a Second Amendment case, "[i]f we adopt a jurisprudence
sympathetic to individual rights, we must give broad compass to
all constitutional provisions that protect individuals from tyranny."1 54 It would be perverse to have a scenario in which the
Court reads certain rights into the Constitution while it reads the
right to keep and bear arms out of the Constitution. This enigmatic approach downplays the written text and exalts the judge's
interpretive beliefs. The dissent's truncated approach ignores Supreme Court precedent that expands constitutional protections
and applies the Bill of Rights to the District. These defects pervade the dissent's position and underscore the logic of the majority's holding. How the Supreme Court considers the D.C. Circuit's
decision and delineates the contours of the Second Amendment is
the subject of the remainder of this article.
151.
152.
153.
154.
denial

Sandidge v. U.S., 520 A.2d 1057, 1058 (D.C. App. 1987).
Id.
Barron v. U.S., 818 A.2d 987, 994 n. 7 (D.C. App. 2003).
Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
of rehearing en banc).
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IV.

THE IMPENDING STORM
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN THE SECOND
AMENDMENT DEBATE

Legal scholarship has not broached how national consensus
impacts the right to keep and bear arms. Yet, national consensus
is of fundamental importance because the Supreme Court has
used it in various constitutional contexts. Since the Court has not
grappled with the Second Amendment in almost seventy years,
the States' treatment of firearm rights in the meantime is instructive.
Although the District of Columbia is not a "State," it is of little
consequence for purposes of this discussion. The District is encompassed in the national consensus. It is an autonomous entity
with its own jurisdiction and legislative and judicial bodies. Chief
Justice John Marshall described it as "a distinct political society."155 The District's views are as relevant as those of any State.
When considering national consensus, the Supreme Court includes the District in its survey. 15 6 Moreover, a Second Amendment interpretation will impact the entire country, not just the
District of Columbia. Thus, the national consensus concerning
firearm rights is a pertinent element in the adjudication of Parker.
A.

States and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms

While the Second Amendment is read narrowly in federal
courts, an individual right to keep and bear arms has found a
more conducive atmosphere in the state realm. As the D.C. Circuit noted in Parker,seven state appellate courts endorse the individual right view. 157 Furthermore, most state constitutions grant
an individual right to keep and bear arms. The state constitutions
fall into three categories: 5 8 thirty-six states provide an explicit
155. Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445, 452 (1805).
156. See e.g. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986); Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 344 (2001).
157. Parkerv. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 380 n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (referring to Hilberg v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 761 P.2d 236, 240 (Colo. App. 1988); Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d
343, 347 n. 5 (Ky. 2006); State v. Blanchard, 776 So. 2d 1165, 1168 (La. 2001); State v.
Nickerson, 247 P.2d 188, 192 (Mont. 1952); Stillwell v. Stillwell, 2001 WL 862620, at *4
(Tenn. App. July 30, 2001); State v. Anderson, 2000 WL 122218, at *7 n. 3 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Jan. 26, 2000); State v. Williams, 148 P.3d 993, 998 (Wash. 2006); Rohrbaugh v. State,
607 S.E.2d 404, 412 (W. Va. 2004)).
158. Robert A. Creamer, History Is Not Enough: Using Contemporary Justificationsfor
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Interpreting the Second Amendment, 45 B.C. L. Rev.
905, 920-25 (2004).
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individual right to keep and bear arms; 15 9 eight states emulate
do not expressly provide
the Second Amendment, 160 and six states
16 1
arms.
bear
and
keep
to
right
for the
The substantial number of state constitutions recognizing an
individual right to keep and bear arms is significant. Even more
salient is the states' direction. In each instance, states strengthened an individual right to keep and bear arms. 6 2 Since 1978,
twelve states have amended or added provisions granting the
right to keep and bear arms. 16 3 The following examples evince
this development. In 1994, Alaska amended its Constitution to
provide "[tihe individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be
denied or infringed by the State or a political subdivision of the
State."1 64 Delaware enacted a provision in 1987 stating, "[a] person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self,
1 65
family, home and State, and for hunting and recreational use."
The State of Maine was blunt in its assessment that "[e]very citizen has a right to keep and bear arms and this right shall never be
questioned."' 1 66 Finally, West Virginia amended its Constitution
in 1986 to read "[a] person has the right to keep and bear arms for
159. Id. at 921 (listing the following state constitutions: Ala. Const. art. I, § 26; Alaska
Const. art. I, § 19; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 26; Colo. Const. art. II, § 13; Conn. Const. art. I,
§ 15; Del. Const. art. I, § 20; Fla. Const. art. I, § 8; Ga. Const. art. I, § 1, P VIII; Idaho
Const. art. I, § 11; Ill. Const. art. I, § 22; Ind. Const. art. I, § 32; Kan. Const. B. of R., § 4;
Ky. Const. § 1; La. Const. art. I, § 11; Me. Const. art. I, § 16; Mich. Const. art. I, § 6; Miss.
Const. art. III, § 12; Mo. Const. art. I, § 23; Mont. Const. art. II, § 12; Neb. Const. art. I, § 1;
Nev. Const. art. I, § 11; N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 2-a; N.M. Const. art. II, § 6; N.D. Const. art.
I, § 1; Ohio Const. art. I, § 4; Okla. Const. art. II, § 26; Or. Const. art. I, § 27; Pa. Const. art.
I, § 21; R.I. Const. art. I, § 22; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 24; Tex. Const. art. I, § 23; Utah Const.
art. I, § 6; Vt. Const. ch. 1, art. XVI; Wash. Const. art. I, § 24; W. Va. Const. art. III, § 22;
Wis. Const. art. I, § 25; Wyo. Const. art. I, § 24).
160. Id. at 920-21 (listing Arkansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Kansas as states with amendments similar to the
Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
161. Id. at 920, 925 (referring to the constitutions of California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, and New Jersey, but noting the Minnesota Constitution states "[hiunting and fishing
and the taking of game and fish are a valued part of our heritage that shall be forever
preserved for the people and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good."
Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 12.). New York provides a statutory provision stating "a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep
and bear arms cannot be infringed." N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 4 (McKinney 1992).
162. Creamer, supra n. 158, at 921-25.
163. Alaska Const. art. I, § 19; Del. Const. art. I, § 20; Fla. Const. art. I, § 8; Idaho Const.
art. I, § 11; Me. Const. art. I, § 16; Neb. Const. art. I, § 1; Nev. Const. art. I, § 11; N.H.
Const. pt. 1, art. 2-a; N.M. Const. art. II, § 6; N.D. Const. art. I, § 1; W. Va. Const. art. III,
§ 22; Wis. Const. art. I, § 25.
164. Alaska Const. art. I, § 19.
165. Del. Const. art. I, § 20.
166. Me. Const. art. I, § 16.
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the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting
and recreational use." 167 This recent trend accentuates what is
otherwise obvious: states protect an individual right to keep and
bear arms.
A common thread in forty-four state constitutions is evidence
of a national consensus. The ubiquity of "concealed carry" laws
erases any doubt. The lucidity of states' constitutional provisions
regarding firearm rights has enabled them to expand such rights
by enacting concealed carry permit laws. As their namesake suggests, these laws allow individuals to carry loaded firearms, subject to various qualifications. 168 A recent phenomenon, these laws
have grown exponentially in the last twenty years. Eight states
had right to carry laws in 1985.169 Florida's passage of a concealed carry statute in 1987 opened the floodgates, as a deluge of
states enacted similar provisions. 170 In 2007, forty-eight states
had some form of concealed carry. 17 1 Of those forty-eight states,
thirty-nine have laws mandating that officials may not arbitrarily
deny a concealed carry application. 172 This system is described as
"shall issue."' 73 The other nine states have "may issue" processes
in which licenses are granted only upon the showing of a compelling need.' 7 4 Only two states, Wisconsin and Illinois, along with
the District of Columbia, do not provide any concealed carry privi75
leges.1
Given this landscape, it is no surprise that gun control referendums fail. In 1976, the people of Massachusetts voted against a
measure that would ban handguns by a margin of more than two
167. W. Va. Const. art. III, § 22.
168. David McDowall et al., Easing Concealed Firearms Laws: Effects on Homicide in
Three States, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 193, 194-95 (1995).
169. John R. Lott, Jr., The Bias against Guns: Why Almost Everything You've Heard
about Gun Control Is Wrong 73 (Regnery Publg. 2003). States with concealed carry permits
include Georgia, Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont,
and Washington. Id.
170. Steven W. Kranz, A Survey of State Conceal and Carry Statutes: Can Small
Changes Help Reduce the Controversy? 29 Hamline L. Rev. 638, 646-47 (2006).
171. National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action, Issues, Fact Sheets, The
Stearns/BoucherRight-to-Carry Reciprocity Bill, http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/
Read.aspx?id=189 (Apr. 26, 2007) [hereinafter NRA-ILA Right-to-Carry Fact Sheet].
172. McDowall, supra n. 168, at 193.
173. NRA-ILA Right-to-Carry Fact Sheet, supra n. 171.
174. Id.; McDowall, supra n. 168, at 193.
175. National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action, Issues, Fact Sheets, H.R.
2088, the Veterans' Heritage Firearms Act, http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/
Read.aspx?id=198&issue=003 (May 10, 2006).
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to one. 176 Californians defeated a handgun ban initiative by sixty
percent in 1982.177 An Illinois town turned down a proposal to
ban handguns in 1985.178 Wisconsin, while being one of only
three jurisdictions that does not maintain some form of concealed
carry, has expressed its pro-gun right sentiments in a series of
proposals. Voters in Madison, Wisconsin rejected a non-binding
179 In 1994,
handgun ban referendum in 1993 by fifty-one percent.
Milwaukee voters rejected a binding handgun ban proposal by
sixty-seven percent, and Kenosha voters defeated a similar initiative by seventy-three percent.' 8 0 These votes culminated in a
1998 statewide referendum in which Wisconsin voters approved,
by a three-to-one margin, an amendment to their state constitution protecting the right to arms "for security, defense, hunting,
18
One exception to this
recreation or any other lawful purpose." '
a ban on handgun
approved
trend is San Francisco, whose voters
possession in 2005. However, a court later struck the ban down
because state law preempted the ordinance.' 8 2 While sporadic,
these votes are consistent in their outcomes. They illustrate yet
another manifestation of the people's belief in an individual right
to possess firearms.
The confluence of state constitutions, concealed carry laws,
and gun referendums highlights the anomalous position of the
District of Columbia. The District's ordinance is the most intrusive gun restriction in the nation. However, the District's position
is not entirely isolated. In 1982, the City of Chicago enacted an
ordinance that amounted to a freeze on handgun ownership. All
83
however, Chicago
firearms must be registered with the city;'
176. Gary Kleck, Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America 363 (Aldine De Gruyter
1991).
177. Peter Hart & Doug Bailey, Gun Control: What Went Wrong in California, 41 Wall
St. J. 34 (Mar. 1, 1983).
178. Laurent Belsie, Chicago Suburb Sticks to its Guns, 77 Christian Sci. Monitor 3
(Apr. 4, 1985). The measure failed by a margin of more than 60 to 40%. Id.
179. Joel Broadway, Gun Ban Proposal Defeated, 97 Wis. St. J. 1A (Apr. 7, 1993).
180. Christopher R. McFadden, The Wisconsin Bear Arms Amendment and the Case
against an Absolute Prohibitionon Carrying Concealed Weapons, 19 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 709,
714 n. 26 (1999).
181. Id. at 709; see also Wis. Const. art. I, § 25.
182. Bob Egelko, Judge Invalidates Prop. H Handgun Ban: Ruling Says Measure Intrudes on an Area Regulated by State, S.F. Chron. (June 13, 2006).
183. Chicago Mun. Code § 8-20-040. The statute reads: "Registration of firearms. (a) All
firearms in the city of Chicago shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter. It shall be the duty of a person owning or possessing a firearm to cause such
firearm to be registered." Id.
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does not issue registration certificates for handguns.1 8 4 San Francisco recently passed an ordinance mandating that all guns have a
trigger lock or be stored in a locked container. 8 5 That the national consensus is not one-sided is further underscored by the
amicus brief filed in Parkerv. Districtof Columbia. The States of
Massachusetts, Maryland, and New Jersey, along with the Cities
of Chicago, Boston, and New York, supported the District of Columbia in its defense of the firearm ordinance.
B.

How National Consensus Influences the Supreme Court

While exceptions to the movement favoring individual firearm rights exist, the Supreme Court cannot ignore the realities
that gun restrictions are viewed skeptically. Thirty-six state constitutions provide for an individual right to keep and bear arms,
and forty-eight states embrace concealed carry. These facts must
be kept at the forefront as the following cases are discussed.
1.

National Consensus and Homosexual Rights

Bowers v. Hardwick involved the constitutionality of a Georgia statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy.' 8 6 Bowers is illuminating for its consideration of state trends.1 8 7 The importance of
how states viewed this conduct was encapsulated in the Court's
framing of the issue. The Court described the question presented
as whether the Constitution "confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws
of the many States that still make such conduct illegal.' 8 8
184. Id. at 8-20-050. The statute reads:
Unregisterable firearms.
No registration certificate shall be issued for any of the following types of firearms:
(a) Sawed-off shotgun, machine gun, or short-barreled rifle;
(b) Firearms, other than handguns, owned or possessed by any person in the city of
Chicago prior to the effective date of this chapter which are not validly registered
prior to the effective date of this chapter;
(c) Handguns, except:
(1) Those validly registered to a current owner in the city of Chicago prior to the
effective date of this chapter ....
Id.
185. Associated Press, San FranciscoPasses Gun Law, N. Co. Times, http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/08/03/news/state/1700 328_2_07.txt (Aug. 2, 2007).
186. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
187. Id. at 192-94.
188. Id. at 190.
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The Bowers Court engaged in a brief Constitutional analysis
before delving into the historical and contemporary prohibitions
against sodomy. Highlighting that every state outlawed sodomy
until 1961, the Court tallied the current figures, noting twenty18 9
four states plus the District of Columbia criminalized sodomy.
In light of these statistics, the Court delivered its coup de grace:
"Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such
conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or
190
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious."
Disputing Hardwick's claim that morality was an improper basis
for the law, the Court concluded it was "unpersuaded that the sod191
omy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this basis."
In the intervening years, those twenty-five states would dwindle to thirteen, leading the Court to lay Bowers to rest in the 2003
decision, Lawrence v. Texas.1 9 2 Lawrence concerned a challenge to
a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy. The Court
overruled Bowers in concluding the petitioners could engage in
93
private conduct under the protection of the Due Process Clause.1
Like Bowers, the Lawrence Court reviewed the history of sodomy
laws, but reached a different conclusion: "Over the course of the
last decades, States with same-sex prohibitions have moved towards abolishing them. 1 9 4 In light of this inclination, the Court
declared "that our laws and traditions in the past half century are
of most relevance here." 19 5 A survey of state laws post-Bowers revealed that of the thirteen remaining states which criminalized
sodomy, only four singled out the homosexual variety. 196 The consensus in favor of decriminalizing homosexual sodomy formed the
mainstay of the Lawrence Court's analysis, reasoning, and holding.
2.

National Consensus and the Death Penalty

State trends have been at the forefront of every major Supreme Court capital punishment case of the last thirty years. In
1976, the seminal case of Gregg v. Georgia marked the return of
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 193-94.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 196.
Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Id. at 578.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 573.
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the death penalty after the Supreme Court halted the punishment
four years earlier in Furman v. Georgia.19 7 The Gregg Court held
capital punishment did not run afoul of the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendments. 198 The Court considered the contemporary values
on the subject, using "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction." 199 Developments after Furman established "that a large population of American society continues to
regard [capital punishment] as an appropriate and necessary
criminal sanction. '20 0 Thirty-five states enacted new statutes providing for the death penalty. 20 1 Citing a referendum and jury verdicts as additional support, the Court concluded capital punishment did not offend the evolving standards of decency. 20 2
A year after Gregg, the Court held capital punishment for the
rape of an adult woman was excessive in Coker v. Georgia.20 3 The
Coker Court noted that "[at] no time in the last 50 years have a
majority of the States authorized death as a punishment for
rape."20 4 The Court seized on the sea change following Furman v.
Georgia. Pre-Furman, sixteen states permitted capital punishment for rapists. 20 5 Post-Furman,only three states provided such
a penalty. 20 6 Additional court challenges whittled the three down
to a lone jurisdiction, Georgia. 20 7 The Coker Court stated that the
trend of the states "obviously weighs very heavily on the side of
rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an
adult woman." 20 Finding an Eighth Amendment violation, the
Court concluded "the legislative rejection of capital punishment
for rape strongly confirms our judgment" that the death penalty
20 9
was disproportionate.
Enmund v. Florida applied the principles of Coker, and held
0
the death penalty unconstitutional for accomplices to murder. 21
State developments took center stage again. Eight states allowed
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 181.
Coker v. Ga., 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594.
Id.
Id. at 595-96.
Id. at 596.
Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
Enmund v. Fla., 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
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the death penalty for a participant in a crime during which a murder occurred. 2 1 1 The Court held "[s]ociety's rejection of the death
penalty for accomplice liability in felony murder" was manifested
212
in the paltry number of jurisdictions imposing the punishment.
Like Coker, the Enmund Court used state trends to hold the death
penalty in certain circumstances contravened the Eighth Amend21 3
ment.
As Coker and Enmund illustrate, national consensus is a
prevalent factor in testing the boundaries of what crimes implicate capital punishment. The Court also used it in evaluating the
age limitations of capital offenders. Stanford v. Kentucky considered whether the death penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-yearold offenders violated the Eighth Amendment. 2 14 The Stanford
Court observed that twenty-five states provided the death penalty
for seventeen-year-old offenders and twenty-two states permitted
capital punishment for sixteen-year-old offenders. 21 5 The Court
commented that such a scenario did not "establish the degree 21of6
national consensus" to render a punishment cruel and unusual.
The petitioners pointed to a federal statute limiting capital punishment to offenders age eighteen and older. 21 7 The Court deferred, reasoning that even a blanket federal prohibition on executing offenders under eighteen would not establish "a national
consensus that such punishment is inhumane" given the "substantial number of state statutes to the contrary."21 8 The Court
discerned "neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus"
against capital punishment for sixteen- or seventeen-year-old of2 19
fenders.
State developments would sound the death knell for Stanford.
In the 2005 decision of Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held
the death penalty for an individual under eighteen when committing the offense violated the Eighth Amendment. 2 20 Examining
the states' legislation, the Roper Court determined that the national consensus opposing the death penalty for juveniles sup211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 789.
Id. at 794.
Id. at 797.
Stanford v. Ky., 492 U.S. 361, 361 (1989).
Id. at 370.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 380.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-71 (2005).
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ported striking down the law. 2 21 Thirty states prohibited the
death penalty for juveniles. 22 2 Those states without a formal prohibition on executing juveniles engaged in the practice sporadi-

cally: "In the past 10 years, only three have done

S0."22

3

The

Court enumerated the reasons for its holding as "the rejection of
the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the con22 4
sistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice."
State trends compelled the Court to again reverse course. In
the 1989 case Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court held executing a mentally retarded individual was not cruel and unusual punishment. 2 25 But by 2002, state trends had eroded the underpinnings
of Penry. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court ruled such executions
infringed upon the Eighth Amendment. 22 6 The Court noted society's attention to the issue and stated "the consensus reflected in
those deliberations informs our answer."2 2 7 The dispositive factor
was the reaction to Penry. Sixteen states passed laws against executing mentally retarded individuals. 2 28 The Court emphasized
"the consistency of the direction of change" in favor of prohibiting
these executions. 2 29 Citing other manifestations of this movement, the Court determined the "consensus unquestionably reflects widespread judgment about the relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders." 230 Finding the Eighth Amendment prohibited such punishments, the Court concluded it had "no reason
to disagree with the judgment of the legislatures that have re'2 3 1
cently addressed the matter.
The aforementioned cases attest that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is driven by state developments. Moreover, this factor is important enough to persuade the Court to reverse itself in
exceedingly short time frames. While the "evolving standards of
decency" test lends itself to gauging national consensus, the next
221. Id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 332
(1989))).
222. Id. at 564.
223. Id. at 565.
224. Id. at 567.
225. Penry, 492 U.S. at 303.
226. Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002).
227. Id. at 307.
228. Id. at 314-15.
229. Id. at 315.
230. Id. at 317.
231. Id. at 321 (internal quotations omitted).
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section shows another context in which the Court examines state
trends.
3.

National Consensus and Euthanasia

The fountainhead of right-to-die jurisprudence, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health considered whether a Missouri
law requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's
wishes as to the withdrawal of treatment violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 23 2 In phrasing the issue, the Court noted, "the majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide." 2 33 The Court
would return to this theme. Scrutinizing the Missouri requirements, the Court stated "[ilt is also worth noting that most, if not
all, States simply forbid oral testimony entirely in determining
the wishes of parties ....",234 With national consensus in tow, the
Court concluded the Constitution did not prevent a State from using a clear and convincing standard to determine an incompetent
2 35
person's wishes to withdraw life saving treatment.
The Court would revisit Cruzan in Washington v. Glucksberg,
which addressed whether Washington State's prohibition of assisted suicide violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 36 The Court
highlighted the near-universal ban on assisted suicide: "In almost
every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a
crime to assist a suicide."2 37 The Court also noted the near-unanimous rejection of assisted suicide referendums. 2 38 While legislatures had introduced bills legalizing assisted suicide, none had
passed. 23 9 To the contrary, states were enacting more explicit
prohibitions of the practice. 2 40 These realities prompted the Court
to conclude "voters and legislators continue for the most part to
reaffirm their States' prohibitions on assisting suicide. 2 4 1
Through this prism, the Court contemplated the constitutional
challenge. The state trend against assisted suicide permeated the
Court's analysis. "To hold for respondents, we would have to re232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261 (1990).
Id. at 280.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 292.
Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997).
Id. at 710.
Id. at 717.
Id.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 716.
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verse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the
considered policy choice of almost every State."2 42 This concern,
coupled with Cruzan, formed the basis of the Court's holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect the right to assisted
suicide. 2 43 The Court's approach to this uncharted area was strikingly similar to its consideration of abortion.
4.

National Consensus and Abortion

Abortion was another issue of first impression in which the
Court drew upon state developments. Roe v. Wade exemplifies the
invocation of state trends. 24 4 Roe and its companion case, Doe v.
Bolton, involved challenges to a series of Texas and Georgia laws
prohibiting abortion. 24 5 The opening paragraph of Roe captured
the Court's sensitivity to legislative trends, where it enunciated
that "[t]he Georgia statutes.., have a modern cast and are a legislative product that ... reflects the influences of recent attitudi-

nal change.

..

"246

The Court embarked on an extensive histori-

cal discourse of abortion. Most States banned abortion through
the early 1960s. 24 7 At that juncture, the pendulum began to shift,
as "a trend toward liberalization of abortion statutes... resulted
in adoption, by about one-third of the States, of less stringent laws
"248

After considering the States' treatment of the practice, the
Court contemplated the views of the medical and legal professions. The Court observed the American Medical Association's
shift in favor of abortion was sparked by "rapid changes in state
laws" and a belief "that this trend will continue." 24 9 The American
Bar Association experienced a similar epiphany in 1972, approving the Uniform Abortion Act. 2 50 The Roe opinion included the
Act in full, along with the Act's Prefatory Note, which the Court
described as "enlightening. '2 5 1 That the Court used this adjective
is telling, given the opening sentence of the Note: "This Act is
based largely upon the New York abortion act following a review
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
Id. at 728.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 143 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
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of the more recent laws on abortion in several states and upon
'25 2
recognition of a more liberal trend in laws on this subject.
With the evolving national consensus at the forefront, the Court
held that abortion fell within the parameters of personal liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
This article argues the Court should be consistent in considering national consensus. However, it would be disingenuous to ignore the Court's own inconsistency in contemplating this question.
Stenberg v. Carhart proves this point. 2 53 In Stenberg, the Court
entertained a constitutional challenge to a Nebraska law which
criminalized the procedure of partial birth abortion. 2 54 The Court
ruled the law infringed upon due process protections. 25 5 The majority recognized the widespread disapproval of the procedure, but
never quantified it. It was left to the dissent to raise the issue of
where the states lie.
Justice Scalia derided the ruling as "a 5-to-4 vote on a policy
matter by unelected lawyers [overcoming] the judgment of 30
state legislatures." 25 6 Justice Kennedy bemoaned Stenberg's
treatment of abortion precedent of which a central premise "was
that the States retain a critical and legitimate role in legislating
on the subject of abortion."2 57 Justice Kennedy chastised the majority for substituting its own "judgment for the judgment of Nebraska and some 30 other States .... ",258 Justice Thomas ended
his dissent lamenting that "today we are told that 30 states are
prohibited from banning one rarely used form of abortion that
they believe to border on infanticide." 2 59 Stenberg notwithstanding, the wellspring of abortion jurisprudence was created on the
foundation of national consensus.

252. Roe, 410 U.S. at 147 n. 41.
253. Stenberg v. Carhart,530 U.S. 914 (2000).
254. Id. at 921.
255. Id. at 945-46.
256. Id. at 955 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 956-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 979.
259. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1020 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court would reverse itself
7 years later when it upheld the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Act in Gonzales v. Carhart,
127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). As the matter did not involve a state law, the Court downplayed the
impact of state trends, although it did acknowledge the 30 states that had banned the
procedure when Stenberg was decided. Id. at 1623.
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5. National Consensus and the Fourth Amendment
Legislative developments have influenced the Court in its determination of whether an arrest comports with the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 2 60 In U.S. v. Watson, the Court held an arrest executed
26 1
without a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Under the common law, officers could make an arrest without a
warrant for an offense committed in their presence. 26 2 The Court
noted "[tihis has also been the prevailing rule under state constitutions and statutes."26 3 Noting almost every State granted statutory authorization for such arrests, the Court was hesitant to implement its "judicial preference" for securing a warrant before
making an arrest. 2 64 Because "the judgment of the Nation and
Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause," the Court found the underlying arrest
2 65
did not implicate Fourth Amendment concerns.
Payton v. New York involved a challenge to a series of New
York statutes allowing police officers to enter a home without a
warrant to make a routine felony arrest. 2 66 The Court held the
Fourth Amendment prohibited such entries. 26 7 Acknowledging
the common law did not unequivocally establish precedent on the
issue, the Court considered the consensus of the states. 2 68
Twenty-four state legislatures provided for warrantless entries
and fifteen proscribed them. 26 9 The Court noted that "although
the weight of state-law authority is clear, there is by no means the
kind of virtual unanimity on this question that was present in
United States v. Watson."270 Citing the "obvious declining trend"
reflected in recent state court decisions, the Court concluded na260. U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." Id.
261. U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
262. Id. at 418.
263. Id. at 419.
264. Id. at 421-23.
265. Id. at 423.
266. Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 597-98.
269. Id. at 598-99.
270. Id. at 600.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2008

37

Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 3

150

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 69

tional consensus did not favor warrantless arrests. 27 1 While national consensus did not deliver the sockdolager it did in other
contexts, it nevertheless persuaded the Court to find warrantless
entries ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
A final example is Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, which considered the constitutionality of warrantless arrests for minor criminal offenses. 272 The petitioners argued the Fourth Amendment
limited police officers' misdemeanor arrest authority.2 7 3 The
Court held the history of the Fourth Amendment and modern developments rejected such a notion. 274 The Court noted petitioners'
argument had never "become 'woven... into the fabric' of American law."2 75 Instead, the Court found "two centuries of uninter-

rupted (and largely unchallenged) state and federal practice permitting warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not amounting to
or involving breach of the peace." 276 The contemporary scene was
no different as "today statutes in all 50 States and the District of
Columbia permit warrantless misdemeanor arrests by at least
some (if not all) peace officers. '277 For effect, the Court attached
an appendix to its opinion listing the fifty-one statutes authorizing warrantless arrests for minor offenses.
6. National Consensus and Free Speech
First Amendment cases have also been scrutinized through
the purview of state developments. While there is a paucity of instances in which national consensus has been debated, the methodology has been invoked to determine the scope of the First
Amendment. Burson v. Freeman involved a free speech challenge
to a Tennessee law prohibiting the solicitation of votes and the
distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance
to a polling place.2 78 The respondent argued the statute limited

her ability to communicate with voters. 279 The Court examined
the origins of such restrictions and noted their popularity, as
every state limited access to polling places. 280 The Court found
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id. at 340 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 344.
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193 (1992).
Id. at 194.
Id. at 206.
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"this widespread and time-tested consensus demonstrates that
some restricted zone is necessary in order to serve the States' compelling interests in preventing voter intimidation and election
fraud." 28 ' Reiterating the importance of the well-established
movement favoring speech limitations, the Court concluded that a
"long history" and "substantial consensus" support the rationale of
28 2
protecting the fundamental right to vote.
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Court struck
down a Minnesota canon of judicial conduct as incompatible with
the First Amendment. 28 3 Only four states had similar speech restrictions, prompting the Court to observe "[tihis practice, relatively new to judicial elections and still not universally adopted,
does not compare well with the traditions deemed worthy of our
attention in prior cases." 28 4 The Court has devoted more attention
to national consensus in other contexts. However, these two decisions established precedent for applying state trends to the First
Amendment.
These excerpts demonstrate the substantial weight afforded
to national consensus. The multitude of cases invoking national
consensus reveals this is not an anomalous approach or limited to
certain contexts. While this methodology is prosaic, it does ensure
the Court's interpretation is within the realm of societal norms.
The Court's consideration of state trends in various areas of constitutional jurisprudence acknowledges this fact. Whether this
factor could be applied to the Second Amendment is the focus of
the following section.
C. Applying National Consensus to the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms
The parties' briefs filed in Parkerdid not address the national
consensus on the right to keep and bear arms. The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals was also silent. However, the preceding sections
establish the plethora of instances in which the Supreme Court
used state trends as a lodestar. There is ample precedent to apply
national consensus in a Second Amendment case. Issues tangled
in the intricate web of social, moral, and cultural values are the
most common terrain for the invocation of national trends. Like
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
Id. at 211.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
Id. at 786.
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abortion, sodomy, and the death penalty, gun rights represent the
perfect storm of legal and social complexities. The Court's extended hiatus from the Second Amendment is further justification
to take into account the states' approach to the right to keep and
bear arms.
The underlying right asserted in Parkeris enshrined in a federal amendment. While a collective right reading from the Court
would leave the firearm provisions of the individual states intact,
a meaningless Second Amendment would be an anomaly given the
national consensus. It would further contrast with the forty-eight
states that elevate individual firearm rights by dint of concealed
carry permits. Additionally, a meaningful Second Amendment
would protect citizens in states with weak commitments to gun
rights.
Colonial and early state enactments addressing the right to
keep and bear arms have been dredged up, pored over, and expounded upon. These analyses are a valuable aid in parsing the
Second Amendment. But in the haste to divine the thought
processes of state legislators in the 1770s, commentators and
courts have disregarded the actions of state legislators in the
1970s. State constitutions, many ratified or amended in more recent times, are relegated to a footnote. Concealed carry laws are
ignored. Debating the meaning of amorphous, opaque, and centuries-old writing ensures a livelier dialogue than simply noting the
obvious. Mundane or not, the national consensus of the last thirty
years cannot be cast out of the Second Amendment debate. This is
not to suggest the evidence distilled from the colonial era is outdated, unimportant, or of lesser worth. However, recent state
laws represent a clear, consistent, and modern approach to the
right to keep and bear arms. Limiting the analysis to state enactments from the late eighteenth century is akin to looking in the
rear view mirror to see the road ahead.
Many state constitutions eschew the militia aspect, or include
it alongside the right to defend oneself as justifications for the
right to keep arms. With the benefit of hindsight, states articulated firearm rights more clearly. 28 5 While the transparency with
which state constitutions address the right to keep and bear arms
is significant, there are additional manifestations of the states'
amenable atmosphere to gun rights. Forty-eight states have some
285. Robert A. Creamer, History Is Not Enough: Using Contemporary Justificationsfor
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Interpretingthe Second Amendment, 45 B.C. L. Rev.
905 (2004).
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form of concealed carry. Forty states follow a "shall-issue" framework. Concealed carry laws are an accurate barometer of the national consensus towards firearms. Such laws are impervious to
the biases of commentators and are undeniable in their message.
Trusting a citizen with the right to carry a firearm in public is the
ultimate embodiment of an individual right to keep and bear
arms. Yet, the vast majority of jurisdictions permit concealed
carry. Such a policy is the polar opposite of the District of Columbia ordinance. Thus, the District's gun ordinance is an aberration
when considering the national consensus.
The thrust of this argument is not that the Court should use
opinion polls or the majority view to guide its decision making.
The raison d'etre of the judiciary is its counter-majoritarian attributes. However, various questions of constitutional nature lend
themselves to examining the evolving nature of society and determining where on that spectrum the current norm lies. National
consensus is not the determinative factor of a constitutional analysis, but one of many considerations. Whatever the merits of this
approach and whatever predominance national consensus is
given, it should be done consistently. Because the Court has used
state trends to gauge the scope of other constitutional protections,
the Court should implement it in a Second Amendment case. The
Court's longstanding silence on the right to keep and bear arms
further engenders such a consideration. Over the last seventy
years, states have experimented with licensing schemes, concealed carry permits, and weapons bans. Their determination
that an individual right to keep and bear arms should be protected, embraced, and expanded, reflects the results of these interactions.
Applying national consensus to the Second Amendment ensures the right to keep and bear arms will not be interpreted in a
time warp. It also maintains consistency. The Court has acknowledged modern realities in other constitutional contexts.
Abortion, gay rights, and the death penalty have been viewed
through the lens of an evolving society, and the Court was impacted by the direction in which states leaned. The States have
spoken with a single voice on the right to keep and bear arms.
This clarity is significantly more pronounced in comparison to
other issues. That the Court has been swayed by lesser consensuses reveals the import of the virtual unanimity on individual
firearm rights.
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INDIVIDUAL FIREARM RIGHTS IN THE FOREIGN REALM

As the preceding section attests, a Second Amendment interpretation by the Court might examine factors beyond the individual-versus-collective paradigm. One such element is international
jurisprudence. The concept of constitutional comparativism entails that international and foreign law should be used to interpret the U.S. Constitution. 2 6 Some Supreme Court justices have
developed a penchant for this theory. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg stated "[wie are the losers if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from others." 28 7 She admitted the Court
could improve "the dynamism with which we interpret our Constitution" by considering foreign decisions. 288 Justice Stephen
Breyer has extolled the virtues of engaging in a more expansive
Constitutional review by engaging foreign views. 28 9 Justice
Anthony Kennedy noted foreign courts "have been somewhat concerned ...that we [do] not cite their decisions with more regular29 1
ity. ' 29 0 This inclination has raised the ire of other justices.

Justice Scalia argued that the notion "American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out
of hand."292 However, these objections have not prevented the
Court from considering the international opinion on the death
penalty, affirmative action, and homosexual rights. While the
Court's invocation of foreign law is not as widespread as its use of
national consensus, international influence cannot be underestimated. The following section illustrates this point.
A.

The Supreme Court's Use of Constitutional Comparativism

Homosexual rights have become a flashpoint in the constitutional comparativism clash. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court invalidated a Texas criminal law that prohibited homosexual sod286. Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism,52 UCLA
L. Rev. 639 (2005).
287. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative
Perspective in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 40 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 1 (2003).
288. Id. at 5.
289. Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional
Cases:A Conversationbetween JusticeAntonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 Intl. J.
Const. L. 519 (2005).
290. Jeffery Tobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passionfor Foreign Law Could
Change the Supreme Court, The New Yorker 22 (Sept. 12, 2005).
291. David Gray, Why Justice Scalia Should Be a Constitutional Comparativist .
Sometimes, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1251 (2007).
292. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/3

42

Keleher: The Impending Storm

2008

THE IMPENDING STORM

omy. 29 3 The Court considered whether the underlying statute
comported with the Constitution in relation to "values we share
with a wider civilization. ' 29 4 The Lawrence Court's critique of its
predecessor, Bowers v. Hardwick, stemmed from multiple concerns. One source of consternation was Bowers' refusal to acknowledge the international jurisprudence involving sodomy.
Five years before Bowers, the European Court of Human Rights
invalidated anti-sodomy laws under the European Convention on
Human Rights. 2 95 Unlike Bowers, the Lawrence Court professed
greater awareness of international dynamics, relying on an amicus curiae brief of the United Nations that condemned anti-sodomy laws. 29 6 The Court remarked that "the reasoning and holding
in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere." 2 97 In holding the Due
Process right of privacy extended to same-sex intimacies, the
Court was impacted by case law from the European Court of
Human Rights and other nations protecting the "right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct." 298 While
Lawrence marks the latest invocation of international law, precedent for such an approach can be traced to Eighth Amendment
case law.
Death penalty decisions are ground zero for the constitutional
comparativism debate. Foreign influence on the "cruel and unusual" determination in the modern era has its roots in Trop v. Dulles. 29 9 Trop involved an Army deserter punished for his offense by
losing his U.S. citizenship. 30 0 The Court ruled that such a penalty
was cruel and unusual. 30 1 The Court noted the "virtual unanimity" of countries that did not inflict statelessness as punishment.30 2 A United Nations survey cited by the Court revealed
30 3
only two countries meted denationalization for desertion.
293. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
294. Id. at 576.
295. Id. (citing Dudgeon v. U.K., 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 52 (1981)).
296. Id. at 576-77; Br. Amici Curiae of Mary Robinson et al., at 11-12, Lawrence v. Tex.,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
297. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
298. Id. (citing Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 52). The Court commented that the European Court of Human Rights has issued additional opinions protecting the right of homosexual adults to engage in consensual conduct. Id. (citing P.G. & J.H. v. U.K., App. No.
44787/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. 56 (Sept. 25, 2001); Modinos v.Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993);
Norris v.Ir., 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988)).
299. Trop v.Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
300. Id. at 88.
301. Id. at 103.
302. Id. at 102.
303. Id. at 103.
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The Supreme Court's 1988 decision of Thompson v. Oklahoma
marked the first death penalty case to consider foreign laws. 30 4 In
Thompson, the Court considered whether the Eighth Amendment
forbade executing juveniles fifteen years old and younger. 30 5 The
Court held such punishments were cruel and unusual. In reaching this determination, the Court noted the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, and the Soviet Union excluded minors from capital punishment. 30 6 The Court found further support from "three major
human rights treaties explicitly prohibit[ing] juvenile death penalties." 30 7 In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court ruled executing men30 8 Cittally retarded criminals violated the Eighth Amendment.
ing an amicus brief authored by the European Union, the Court
highlighted that "within the world community, the imposition of
the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." 30 9 While the Court did
not spend significant time on foreign laws in Thompson and Atkins, its raising the subject was groundbreaking.
Finally, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court used foreign guidance to determine the Eighth Amendment forbade the imposition
of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. Boding ill for the Second Amendment, the Roper Court's holding that the death penalty
for juvenile offenders was unconstitutional found "confirmation in
the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the
world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty."3 10 The Court cited the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, which prohibits capital punishment for
crimes committed by individuals under eighteen. 3 1 1 The Court
further relied on England's abolishment of executing any person
under eighteen at the time of the offense, in effect since 1948.312
Roper and its predecessors establish constitutional comparativism
has become an integral part of the Eighth Amendment equation.
304. Thompson v. Okla., 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
305. Id. at 817.
306. Id. at 830-31.
307. Id. at 831, n. 34.
308. Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304 (2002). For an analysis of the role of international law
in persuasive amicus filings, see Gordon R. Jimison, Amicus Filingsand InternationalLaw:
Toward a Global View of the United States Constitution, 55 Cath. U. L. Rev. 267 (2005).
309. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-17 n. 21.
310. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
311. Id. (citing Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37(a) (entered into force Sept.
2, 1990) GA Res. 44/25, UN CRC/C, 44th Sess. (available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/k2crc.htm)).
312. Id. at 577-78.
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Affirmative action is another issue in which the Court solicited international views. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court held
that student body diversity in law school education constituted a
compelling state interest. 3 13 In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg
noted the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination endorses "measures to ensure the
adequate development and protection of certain racial groups...
for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment
of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 3 14 Justice Ginsberg
also cited the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women for support.3 1 5 While the international consensus did not command the majority's attention, it is
revealing that such considerations impacted at least one justice.
The final case that bears mentioning is Printz v. U.S.316
While foreign guidance had a peripheral role in the adjudication,
its context is noteworthy. Printz concerned a challenge to the
Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act ("Brady Act"). However,
gun control and the Second Amendment played bit parts while
federalism took center stage. The Printz Court held unconstitutional provisions of the Brady Act requiring local officials to accept
Brady Act forms and perform background checks on handgun applicants. 3 17 The Court reasoned that state legislatures were not
3
subject to federal direction. 18
Constitutional comparativism reared its head in an exchange
between the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer and the Printz
majority. Justice Breyer concurred with Justice Stevens' dissent
that Congress had the ability to pass whatever laws are necessary
and proper to carry out its enumerated powers. 3 19 But Justice
Breyer further argued that foreign governments could shed light
on the question of federalism. Referencing the federal systems of
Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, Justice Breyer
remarked, "all provide that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the central 'federal' body. ' 320 To bol313. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
314. Id. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Annex to GA Res. 2106, UN GAOR,
20th Sess., Res. Supp. 14, art. 2(2), 47, UN Doc. A/6014 (1965)).
315. Id.
316. Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
317. Id. at 923-24, 933, 935.
318. Id. at 923-24.
319. Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ster his assertion, Justice Breyer cited authorities arguing the European paradigm facilitated less interference with local
32 1
authority.
Justice Breyer's theory drew a sharp retort from the majority.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated, "[w]e think such
comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
constitution .... *"322 The majority further added, "[tihe fact is
''3 23 While Printz devoted only
that our federalism is not Europe's.
a few paragraphs to international dynamics, its presence in a federalism opinion speaks volumes.
The sporadic use of constitutional comparativism can be
traced to the nascent nature of this methodology. The frequency
in which international views are solicited will increase, as this
movement is in its ascendancy. The Second Amendment may become implicated in this trend. Admittedly, the Second Amendment is sui generis, making comparison with other countries inexact. 3 24 Few nations have laws resembling the Second Amendment. Firearms have a unique significance in American law and
culture, posing a problem for those seeking to rely on international views. Nonetheless, the Court's use of foreign law as an aid
in interpreting the Constitution could surface in a Second Amendment decision. The following sections explore this scenario.
B.

The International Community's Condemnation of Individual
FirearmRights

Current world opinion favors prohibiting individual access to
firearms. Such views are severe enough to abrogate the Second
Amendment. A manifestation of this view is the increasing interest of international bodies in controlling firearms. As one commentator notes, "[left unchecked, international gun control will
321. Id. at 976-77.
322. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n. 11 (majority).
323. Id.
324. Even comparing murder rates between the U.S. and other countries results in
skewed findings. The most instructive comparisons with U.S. crime rates would use Australia or Great Britain, both of which instituted strict gun laws in recent years. As John
Lott explains, in 1996 Britain banned handguns, and by 2000 gun crimes had risen 40%.
Lott, Jr., supra n. 169, at 77. The UK leads the U.S. by an almost 2-to-1 margin in violent
crime. Id. "The English and American peoples still share notions of England as the peaceable kingdom, of America as the violent republic. But the truth of this particular comparison matters deeply because of its policy implications. The Anglo-American contrast is cited
repeatedly as proof that more guns means more crime." Joyce Lee Malcolm, Guns and
Violence: The English Experience 218-19 (Harv. U. Press 2002).
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compromise a fundamental human right as viewed by U.S. citizens." 32 5 The United Nations began focusing on restricting fire-

arms after passing a resolution in

1995.326

A product of that reso-

lution was a 1997 report which devised "methods to control and
eliminate such accumulations and transfers of small arms and
light weapons." 3 27 The U.N.'s efforts intensified in 2001 after it
held a Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All Its Aspects. 3 28 The conference defined "small
arms" as, inter alia, "revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles, submachine guns, assault rifles." 329 The second Biennial Meeting of
States to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small
Arms was held in July 2005. The intransigence of the United
States frustrated the U.N. Conference President, who decried, "I
must, as President, also express my disappointment over the Conference's inability to agree, due to the concerns of one State, on
language recognizing the need to establish and maintain controls
over private ownership of these deadly weapons .. "..",330
Ultimately, the United States' obstinacy would not impede the U.N.'s
efforts.
In October of 2006, U.N. member states voted to create the
Arms Trade Treaty. 33 1 This agreement will regulate the sale and
325. Joseph Bruce Alonso, InternationalLaw and the United States Constitution in Conflict: A Case Study on the Second Amendment, 26 Hous. J. Intl. L. 1, 2 (2003) (explaining
the U.N.'s efforts toward international gun control and how those efforts conflict with the
American right to bear arms).
326. The U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 50/70 B on December 12, 1995, giving the Secretary-General a mandate "to report on the phenomenon of small arms." See
Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, UN A, 52d Sess., UN Doc. Al
52/298 (Aug. 27, 1997); Bobby L. Scott, The U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small
Arms and Light Weapons: An Exercise in Futility, 31 Ga. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 681,683 (2003)
(discussing in detail the germination of the U.N.'s involvement with firearms).
327. General and Complete Disarmament, GA Res. 50/70B, UN GAOR, 90th plen. mtg.,
UN Doc. A/RES/50/70 A-R (1996). The U.N. defines "small arms" as including revolvers,
rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns and assault rifles, and "light weapons" as light and
heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, anti-tank and aircraft guns and mortars of calibers less than 100mm. Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, supra
n. 326.
328. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN A, 23, UN Doc. A/CONF.192/15 (2001) (available at
http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cab/smallarms/files/aconf192-15.pdf) [hereinafter UN Report].
329. Brochure of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN A, 56th year, UN Doc. DPI/2183 (2001) (available at
http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/smallarms/brochure.htm).
330. UN Report, supra n. 328, at 23; see 'also Bonanno, supra n. 134, at 463-64.
331. BBC News, UN Initiates Arms Trade Agreement (2006) (available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6088200.stm) (updated Oct. 27, 2006).
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transfer of guns. The resolution passed overwhelmingly, as 139
countries voted for the resolution, 24 abstained, and the lone opposing vote was the United States. 33 2 The resolution charges the
U.N. to create "a comprehensive, legally-binding instrument establishing common standards for the import, export and transfer
of conventional arms." 3 33 The treaty is currently being drafted,
and it is clear the end result will spawn additional showdowns
between the U.S. and the U.N.
The Second Amendment and international opinion are on a
collision course. The contrast between the United States and its
neighbors is embodied in their recurring disputes over firearm
regulations. The United States' persistence in clinging to the Second Amendment has made it the bate noire of the international
community. It is unclear whether the United States' isolated position will influence the Court's views. The Court would seemingly
have to diverge from its recent efforts coalescing around international opinion if it read the Second Amendment broadly. Considering individual firearm rights through an international lens is a
complex endeavor. While current world opinion disfavors individual gun rights, there lies a deeper issue which the international
community and collective right adherents often ignore.
C. Disarmament: The Gateway to Tyranny
While the Second Amendment's meaning is one of constitutional interpretation, it is difficult to examine any issue, let alone
the right to keep and bear arms, in a jurisprudential vacuum.
Lurking beneath the patina of Second Amendment vernacular are
policy considerations. Constitutional scholar Akhil Amar notes
that since an expansive reading of the Second Amendment "is a
policy choice rather than a clear constitutional command, we are
entitled to ask ourselves whether a given broad reading makes
good sense as a matter of principle and practice." 3 34 Thus, the policy implications of an individual right reading are a critical component of the Second Amendment question.
Given the attention on the Second Amendment, one would assume analysts have scrutinized the entire policy spectrum. But
those advocating a narrow right to keep and bear arms have left a
332. Id.
333. U.N. General Assembly, International Arms Trade Treaty Aim of Draft Resolution,
Press Release (Oct. 26, 2006), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gadis3335.doc.htm.
334. Amar, supra n. 13, at 895.
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significant weakness exposed in their haste to highlight the deleterious consequences of guns. This Achilles' heel concerns the
mayhem that ensues once individual firearm rights are curtailed.
Unarming a populace has been the hallmark of tyrannous regimes. History shows a defenseless population is an integral ingredient to genocide. While firearm restrictions are not synonymous with disarmament, the slope between the two is slippery.
This in no way suggests collective right adherents seek disarmament or approve of despotic regimes, but rather have not fully addressed their positions' consequences. Collective right and gun
control advocates' refusal to construe their positions in an historical light represents a significant failing. This neglect cannot be
excused, as numerous commentators have outlined the sordid con3 35
nection between disarmament and tyranny.
Historians have deduced that in the twentieth century, 262
million deaths have been at the hands of governments. 336 One authority explains: "It is as though our species has been devastated
by a modern Black Plague. And indeed it has, but a plague of
Power, not germs." 3 37 Anxiety about a centralized government engaging in mass murder is not fanciful, but grounded in the harshness of history. While the background, impetus, and methodology
of these genocides vary, there remains one constant: disarmament. Other factors that precipitate mass murder exist. However, it strains credulity to contend the link between disarmament
and tyranny is tenuous. Abolishing guns promotes a pliant populace. This premise is proven by history and based in common
sense, because "from the point of view of any aggressor, it is desirable if not essential that intended victims not possess weapons,
3 38
especially firearms."
Those advocating a weak Second Amendment do not defend
tyrants. However, the society they seek is ripe for governmental
abuse. That those pining for a narrow Second Amendment ultimately desire disarmament is not hyperbole. The following ex335. See e.g. R. J. Rummel, Death by Government (Transaction Publishers 1997); David
B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Global Deaths from Firearms: Searching for
Plausible Estimates, 8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 113 (2004); Stephen P. Halbrook, Nazi Firearms
Law and the Disarmingof the German Jews, 17 Ariz. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 483 (2000); Daniel
D. Polsby & Don B. Kates, Jr., Of Holocausts and Gun Control, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 1237
(1997).
336. Rummel, supra n. 335, at 1-28; see also R. J. Rummel, Freedom, Democide, War,
20th Century Democide, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/20TH.HTM (accessed Nov. 8,
2007).
337. Rummel, supra n. 335, at 9.
338. Polsby & Kates, Jr., supra n. 335, at 1242.
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cerpts prove a meaningful Second Amendment is a necessary bulwark against disarmament advocates.
United States Senator Dianne Feinstein, commenting on an
assault weapons ban, stated "[ilf I could have gotten 51 votes in
the Senate of the United States for an outright ban, picking up
every one of them, Mr. and Mrs. America turn them all in, I would
have done it. ' ' 33 9 Former United States Senator Howard Metzenbaum complained that the same ban was insufficient, exclaiming,
"until you ban them all, you might as well ban none .... [But, it]
will be a major step in achieving the objective that we have in
mind." 340 United States Congressman William L. Clay proclaimed the 1993 Brady Bill was a "minimum step" that Congress
should take in its efforts to restrict firearms. Congressman Clay
professed, "[w]e need much stricter gun control, and eventually we
should bar the ownership of handguns except in a few cases." 34 1 A
fellow member of the House of Representatives, Congressman
Bobby Rush, was also forthright in his strategy: "Ultimately, I
would like to see the manufacture and possession of handguns
banned except for military and police use. But that's the endgame." 34 2 Senator Lincoln Chafee was no less bashful when he
asserted, "I shortly will introduce legislation banning the sale,
manufacture or possession of handguns .... It is time to act. We
cannot go on like this. Ban them!"34 3 The recent tragedy at Virginia Tech prompted Congressman Dennis Kucinich to draft legislation "that would ban the purchase, sale, transfer, or possession
of handguns by civilians." 34 4 While such views have not garnered
a majority of lawmakers, these statements are notable for their
stridency and frankness.
The desire to ban firearms is not the exclusive province of federal officials. San Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros and Baltimore
339. Chris Cox, 2nd Amendment: Mr. and Mrs. America, Turn Them All in, S.F. Chron.
D5 (Mar. 7, 2004).
340. 139 Cong. Rec. S15432 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1993).
341. Robert L. Koenig, NRA-Backed Measure May DerailBrady Bill, St. Louis Post Dispatch 1A (May 8, 1991). See also Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42
Am. U. L. Rev. 53 (1992) (examining the invocation of the slippery slope argument in the
gun control debate).
342. Evan Osnos, Bobby Rush: Democrat, U.S. House of Representatives, Chi. Trib. C3
(Dec. 5, 1999) (quoting Rep. Bobby Rush).
343. Sen. John H. Chafee, In View of Handguns' Effects, There's Only One Answer: A
Ban, Minneapolis Star Trib. 13A (June 15, 1992).
344. Dennis J. Kucinich, Kucinich Offers Comprehensive Plan to Address Violence in
America, http://kucinich.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=62819
(accessed Jan. 31, 2008).
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Mayor Kurt Schmoke signed the Communitarian Network's The
Case for Domestic Disarmament, which provided: "There is little
sense in gun registration. What we need to significantly enhance
public safety is domestic disarmament .... Domestic disarmament entails the removal of arms from private hands. '3 45 One gun
control adherent admitted, "[wie will never fully solve our nation's
horrific problem of gun violence unless we ban the manufacture
3 46
and sale of handguns and semiautomatic assault weapons."
While not all collective right adherents espouse such views,
their reading of the Second Amendment could lead to such restrictions. Such policies are not without consequences. The events below are examined with a singular focus on firearm laws. While
other factors played a role in these massacres, the following sections weave a mosaic of murder, linked by the common strand of
restricting firearm rights.
1.

Turkey Disarms the Armenians

The dispute over Turkey's slaughter of Armenians during
World War I is well known. Turkey's refusal to acknowledge the
atrocities periodically sparks diplomatic rows with the United
States and European Union. Unfortunately, the events that led to
the carnage are often ignored. While the enmity between the
Turkish government and Armenians was multifaceted, the government's solution to resolving the dispute was simple. Turkey
first curtailed the firearm rights of Armenians, and then eliminated all their rights.
Turkey had learned the consequences of oppressing an armed
populace. In 1894, Armenians had taken up arms and fought back
after state-sanctioned persecution. 34 7 After weeks of fighting, the
government promised the fighters pardons if they ceased fighting. 348 After acquiescing, the government slaughtered the entire
contingent. 34 9 This experience was a catalyst to strip Armenians
of their weapons.
In 1910, the Turkish government enacted a law banning the
manufacture and importation of weapons, the carrying of weap345. Amitai Etzioni & Steven Hellend, The Case for Domestic Disarmament, http:ll
www.gwu.edu/-ccps/pop disarm.html (accessed Nov. 8, 2007).
346. Jeff Muchnick, Better Yet, Ban All Handguns, USA Today llA (Dec. 29, 1993).
347. Edward Alexander, A Crime of Vengeance: An Armenian Struggle for Justice 34
(Maxwell Macmillan Intl. 1991).
348. Id.
349. Id.
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ons, cartridges, and gunpowder. 3 50 Five years later, as historian
R. J. Rummell explains, "under the guise of wartime necessity,
and to protect against possible sabotage and rebellion by Armenians, the government demanded that Armenians in all towns and
villages turn in their arms or face severe penalties." 3 5 1 Armenian
troops serving under Turkish forces "were disarmed, demobilized,
and grouped into labor battalions. Concurrently, the Armenian
These assessments
civilian population was also disarmed. .".."352
are not slanted summations of revisionist scholars. The Turks
made their intentions known in black and white. An "official proclamation" of the Ottoman Empire provided: "Armenians being
prohibited to carry any fire arms, they must surrender to the government all kinds of arms, pistols, bombs and daggers that they
have hidden in their houses or out of the doors." 35 3 Restricting
firearm rights was the entreaty to eliminating 1.5 million Armenians between 1915 and 1917.
The atrocities that followed were wicked not only in their sadism but their expediency. The government murdered approximately seventy percent of the Armenians in a single year, surpassing Adolf Hitler, who killed about forty percent of the Jewish
population over five years. 35 4 The soldiers would "rape the girls
and murder the young men-all this in the presence of parents. '3 55 Officials would compete to devise the cruelest torment,
the prize going to a man who devised the idea of "nailing horseshoes to the feet of his Armenian victims." 3 56 Such violence continued unabated as the Armenians had no way to fight back and
the international community was transfixed with World War I.
Turkey is the first instance of the twentieth century in which an
unarmed population was led to its slaughter. Sadly, it was not the
last.

350. The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code at 122-23.
351. Rummel, supra n. 335, at 217.
352. Robert F. Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust 143-44 (U. Chi. Press 1992).
353. Jay Simkin, Aaron Zelman, & Alan M. Rice, Lethal Laws 91 (June 13, 1913).
354. Id. at 223.
355. Id.
356. Id.
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2. The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany Repress Firearm
Rights
The Armenian massacre was replicated in the Soviet Union
and Nazi Germany, but to an exponential degree. The parallels
between the Soviet and Nazi regimes' repressive techniques are
striking. The Soviet Union began instituting firearm restrictions
in 1918 when Vladimir Lenin decreed that all citizens surrender
their firearms, ammunition, and sabers to the government. 3 5 7 A
few years later, the government made firearm possession punishable by hard labor. Soviet Decree exempted Communist Party
members from surrendering their arms: "The Military Commissars are ordered not to take rifles and revolvers in the possession
of members of the Russian Communist Party .... ,358 By 1929,
firearm owners were personae non gratae.35 9 In tandem with
these firearm restrictions, Joseph Stalin instituted policies clamping down on other freedoms. For the next twenty-five years, more
than 20 million dissidents, unable to defend themselves, were
3 60
starved to death or rounded up and exterminated.
Across the Danube, Germany was engaging in its own atrocities, facilitated by an unarmed Jewish population. Nazi Germany
represents the best known example of disarmament leading to genocide. As Adolf Hitler and his Nazi party solidified their grip on
power, the Nazis enacted the "Weapons Law" in March of 1938
which implemented gun control, barred Jewish people from businesses involving firearms, and exempted Nazi officials from any
firearm restrictions. 3 6 1 A few months later Germany enacted ad3 62
ditional gun control under the "Regulations Against Jews" Act.
The new law unabashedly singled out Jews, proclaiming: "Jews
are prohibited from acquiring, possessing, and carrying firearms
and ammunition, as well as truncheons or stabbing weapons.
Those now possessing weapons and ammunition are at once to
turn them over to the local police authority." 36 3 By 1939, the Nazi
regime had completely repressed the Jewish population and other
357. Aaron Zelman & Richard W. Stevens, Death by "Gun Control": The Human Cost of
Victim Disarmament(Mazel Freedom Press 2001).
358. Simkin et al., supra n. 353, at 125.
359. "Owning a pistol meant an obligatory conviction for terrorism .... " Aleksandr I.
Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 195 (Harper & Row 1974).
360. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror:A Reassessment 484-87 (Oxford U. Press 1990).
361. Simkin et al., supra n. 353, at 156.
362. Id.
363. Simkin et al., supra n. 353, at 183.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2008

53

Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 3

166

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 69

enemies of the state. 36 4 From 1939 to 1945, 10 million defenseless
people were rounded up and exterminated.
3.

CurrentAtrocities Spawned by Disarmament

The aforementioned examples are not relics of a bygone era.
History repeats itself in Zimbabwe. Once "the breadbasket of Africa," the country is now a human rights crisis. 365 Elected in 1980,
President Robert Mugabe has slowly perpetrated a systematic
raping of people and land. As Newsweek reports, "Mugabe's rule
is increasingly taking on the outlines of the worst dictatorships." 36 6 Mugabe at first limited his violence to white farmers.
As author Amy Chua describes, "furious mobs wielding sticks,
axes, crossbows, iron bars, sharpened bicycle spokes, and AK-47
automatic rifles have invaded and ripped apart white-owned commercial farms. Usually by the hundreds, sometimes a thousand at
a time, the invaders ... ransack and destroy ...beating, raping,
abducting."3 6 7 Chua notes the "assaults have not been spontaneous. Rather, they have been sponsored and encouraged by the
368
Zanu-PF government of President Robert Mugabe."
Mugabe's oppressive tactics eventually became colorblind.
Murder and torture have become the central planks of his domestic policy.3 6 9 The country has descended into a police state, where
voicing opposition to Mugabe is akin to a death wish. The government's ultimate goal is simple. Didymus Mutasa, Zimbabwe's
Minister of State, chillingly commented, "We would be better off
with only six million people, with our own people who support the
liberation struggle. We don't want all these extra people."3 7 °
Zimbabwe's population is twelve million.
Mugabe's crimes have proceeded with minimal encumbrance
thanks to their victims' defenseless state. President Mugabe did
364. Zelman, supra n. 357.
365. BBC, Weekly Economic Report, Zimbabwe; Grain Board Preparingto Restock Supplies with South African Maize (Oct. 8, 1991); Steve Newman, Earthweek: A Diary of the
Planet, Atlanta J. & Const., El (Nov. 7, 1992) (available at http:ll
www.atlantamusicguide.com/atlantajournal-constitution.htm).
366. Scott Johnson, Digging a Grave for Zimbabwe, 149 n. 25 Newsweek 38 (June 18,
2007).
367. Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic
Hatred and Global Instability 127-28 (Doubleday 2003).
368. Id.
369. Johnson, supra n. 366, at 38.
370. Kevin Engle & Gregory Stanton, Facing Mass Murder in Zimbabwe, http://
www.genocidewatch.org/ZimbabweFacingMassMurderl2August2005.htm (Aug. 12, 2005).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/3

54

Keleher: The Impending Storm

2008

THE IMPENDING STORM

167

not initiate the gun control laws of his country; he inherited them
from the British, descendants of whom ruled the country until
1980. The 1957 Rhodesian Firearms Act mandated that all firearm purchases go through a licensed dealer in order to ensure a
government paper trail. "The records of all transactions-the
names of licensed gun owners, and details of the firearms they
371
own-go straight to the office of the president, Robert Mugabe."
Mugabe took the firearm restrictions to a new level-abolishment.
In 2000, the government ordered the seizure of all white-owned
firearms. The Zimbabwe Information Minister confirmed that
"police had orders to scour all 4,000 white-owned farms for unlicensed firearms ... [and] ammunition."3 7 2 Recognizing the benefits of disarming those he sought to exploit, Mugabe ordered all
civilians to surrender their firearms in 2005. 3 73 This measure was
followed by the government's "clean-up" campaign, which "left
close to a million people without shelter after their shanty homes
3 74
were demolished."
Zimbabwe's economy has been in a downward spiral for years.
The ruinous economic consequences caused by the seizure of
white-owned farms represents a microcosm of Mugabe's financial
incompetence. Mugabe has ruled with complete disregard for fundamental economic realities, with predictable results. Mugabe
has instituted price controls on basic necessities such as food and
gasoline. 37 5 Such policies have sent prices skyrocketing. As the
economy headed due south, Mugabe fixed the exchange rate.3 76 In
the meantime, the government doled out money to allies of the
government and wasted funds on boondoggles.3 7 7 The sum total of
these policies was manifested in inflation rates of 7600%.378 Such
stratospheric inflation rates cannot be corralled because the gov371. Kopel et al., supra n. 335, at 413.
372. David Blair, Police Search Besieged Farms for Guns, Daily Telegraph 5, http:l!
www.zimbabwesituation.com/aprill9(2).html (Apr. 18, 2000).
373. ZWNews.com, Harare Compels Public to Surrender Their Guns, http://zwnews.com/
issuefull.cfm?ArticleID=12207 (June 30, 2005).
374. Id.
375. Robert Guest, The Shackled Continent: Power, Corruption, and African Lives 34
(Smithsonian Books 2004).
376. Id. at 34-35.
377. Id. at 36-37.
378. Scott Baldauf, Why Africa Won't Rein in Mugabe, Christian Sci. Monitor (May 16,
2007) (available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0516/pOlsOl-woaf.htm); Macdonald
Dzirutwe & Nelson Banya, Zimbabwe Inflation Hits Record as Mugabe Tightens Grip,
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL2288696920070822 (Aug. 22, 2007).
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real cause: the regime's habit of
ernment has "failed to address the
'379
bills.
its
pay
to
printing money
The people of Zimbabwe endure these woes because their ability to effectuate change is negligible. Mugabe rigs elections and
inflicts lethal violence on opposition party supporters. During
election season, government-owned newspapers extol the virtues
of Mugabe. 38 0 The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF) dominates the parliament, airwaves, and foreign aid inflow. ZANU-PF-sponsored soldiers intimidate opposition voters into submission. One author described his experience
during the 2000 election: "At least thirty people were killed,
thousands were forced to flee their homes, and the [opposition
party] was prevented from campaigning in large swathes of the
country." 38 ' Thus, the results of Zimbabwean elections are preordained.
Mugabe's terror campaign has driven the nation to the brink
of starvation and bankruptcy. The Zimbabwean people now face
tremendous hardship, "including chronic food, fuel, and foreign
currency shortages." 38 2 They cannot challenge Mugabe through
either ballot or bullet. This sad scenario is yet another manifestation of prohibiting a people's right to keep and bear arms.
4.

EthiopiaAverts Conquest

The historical picture of firearms and tyranny is not entirely
lugubrious. One African nation proves firearms can ensure freedom. Excluding a brief five-year stint during World War II, Ethiopia bears the distinction of being the only country in Africa never
colonized. This outcome cannot be attributed to geography, undesirability, or mere fortuity. Ethiopia's ability to stave off capitulation to colonial powers can be traced to firearms.
Ethiopia had a significant institutional advantage against colonial intrusion in that it already was an established state when
38 3
the Scramble for Africa began in the late nineteenth century.
Thus, it would be disingenuous to assert firearms alone preserved
Ethiopia. However, it would be equally disingenuous to downplay
the role of weapons in Ethiopia and their importance in repelling
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

Guest, supra n. 375, at 36.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 42.
Dzirutwe & Banya, supra n. 378.
John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent 171 (Cambridge U. Press 1995).
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colonial powers. Though other factors played a hand in the country's fate, Ethiopia's ability to defend itself was its saving grace.
"It cannot be gainsaid that fire-arms played a basic role in the
38 4
preservation of Ethiopian independence."
A succession of Ethiopian rulers were driven to secure a stable flow of weaponry. During the 1860s, Emperor Theodore
sought weapons through trade, diplomacy, and industry. 38 5 After
Theodore's reign, Emperor Yohannes continued his predecessor's
legacy, expanding the nation's supply of guns.38 6 The successor of
Yohannes, Emperor Menelik, completed the arms-obsessed troika.
Menelik "decided that the procurement of modern weaponry was
essential" to the nation's survival. 38 7 Through trading, Menelik
acquired "tens of thousands of magazine-loading rifles, millions of
rounds of ammunition and dozens of modern rifled artillery
guns."s
gun *388

These arms proved their worth on multiple occasions. In
1876, Ethiopian forces routed well-armed Egyptian invaders at
Gura. 38 9 In 1896, Ethiopia stopped an Italian advance at the decisive Battle of Adowa, leading to the Treaty of Addis Ababa in
which Italy recognized Ethiopia as an independent state. 3 90 Without firearms, Ethiopia would have succumbed to these foreign invaders. Ethiopia's experience is another example of the incomplete policy analysis by gun control adherents and collectivists.
Commentators have ignored the important story of Ethiopia and
the defensive use of firearms, painting a skewed picture of the effects of firearm restrictions. Ethiopia offers another compelling
chapter in the saga of firearms in foreign lands.
D. A Collective Silence on the Consequences of Disarmament
The events set forth above convey the tragic consequences of
defenseless people manipulated by tyrants. A 2004 law review article made a compelling case for the correlation between gun
384. Richard Pankhurst, Guns in Ethiopia, 20 Transition 26, 33 (1965).
385. Id. at 29.
386. Id.
387. Greg Blake, First Italo-Abyssinian War: Battle of Adowa, available at http:ll
www.historynet.com/warsconflicts/19_century/3028431.html?featured=&c=y
(accessed
Dec. 27, 2007).
388. Id.
389. Haggai Erlich, The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Nile 70 (Lynne
Riener 2002).
390. Iliffe, supra n. 383, at 171.
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prohibitions and genocide. 3 9 1 This piece delivers a debilitating
blow to those seeking increased firearm restrictions. Unfortunately, a rejoinder to their thesis has not yet been articulated.
Collective right adherents are eerily silent on the role of disarmament in genocides. While ignoring the historical correlation between disarmament and mass murder, commentators scoff at the
contention that firearms would prevent a national government
with standing armies and massive weaponry. A cursory review of
military history reveals the frequency with which small arms can
challenge a better-equipped force. 39 2 Firearms and sheer will
have proven a combustible mix for those fighting insurgent forces.
Colonial experiences with insurgencies reveal that no amount of
manpower, material, or money could surmount determined insurgencies with a modicum of firepower. Americans should be sensitive to this axiom, as the recent events in Iraq once again establish that firearms can provide a formidable menace to sophisti3 93
cated, technological, and heavy artillery.
The refusal of gun control advocates to address the massacres
facilitated by disarmament and its distant cousin, gun control, is
fascinating. One exception to this silence involves gun control in
Nazi Germany. 3 94 Some commentators have challenged the hy395
pothesis that gun control paved the way for Hitler's atrocities."
Instead, they contend Germany's lack of gun restrictions engendered the capitulation of Nazi foes. One commentator rebuked
this thesis. 3 96 "A regime that would disarm and murder an entire
segment of the population hardly could be said to support... 'the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms.' Indeed, that is the
very kind of regime this right is meant to provide the means to
resist."3 97 A Holocaust historian confirms this point: "The indis391. Kopel et al., supra n. 335, at 113.
392. See John P. Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War,
1961-1974 (Greenwood Press 1997); Martin Windrow, The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and
the French Defeat in Vietnam (Da Capo Press 2004).
393. See Levinson, supra n. 19, at 657 (discussing the phenomenon of small arms versus
conventional military firepower).
394. See e.g. Bernard E. Harcourt, On Gun Registration,the NRA, Adolf Hitler, and Nazi
Gun Laws: Exploding the Gun Culture Wars (A Call to Historians),73 Fordham L. Rev. 653
(2004); Deborah Homsher, Response to Bernard E. Harcourt's "On Gun Registration,"73
Fordham L. Rev. 715 (2004); Robert J. Spitzer, Don't Know Much about History, Politics,or
Theory, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 721 (2004).
395. Id.
396. Stephen P. Halbrook, Nazism, the Second Amendment, and the NRA: A Reply to
Professor Harcourt, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 113, 116 (2006).
397. Id.
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pensable need, of course, was arms." 398 The commentary addressing Nazi Germany's gun policies is an insufficient rejoinder because it ignores the larger picture, the penchant of despotic regimes for using gun control to further their ends.
Some epochs will see tyranny and violence abate. However,
the despotic lust for power underlying the tyrannical governments
of Stalin and Hitler will never vanish. That such a fate could befall the United States is brushed aside, ostensibly because Americans are too educated, wealthy, and technologically advanced.
Such a view shows no appreciation for history. This approach is
described as "one aspect of the theory of American exceptionalism-the idea that we Americans are different from and perhaps
better than the other members of the human race. '3 99 Take away
the Bill of Rights and American "exceptionalism" evaporates. It is
folly to think American soil inoculates its inhabitants from revolution, strife, or tyranny. This misconception is grounded in myopic
romanticism. An advanced society can engage in atrocities as well
as an undeveloped one. What a massacring movement cannot
overcome, at least with not serious costs, is an armed populace.
While the probability of such a catastrophe is infinitesimal, an insurance policy against such devastation is a wise course.
Justice Joseph Story called "the right of the citizens to keep
and bear arms" the "palladium of the liberties of the republic," because it "offers a strong moral check against usurpation and arbitrary power of the rulers."40 0 The bloodletting of the twentieth
century reinforces this axiom. If the Supreme Court is to invoke
international views, it should take notice of the tyranny that has
ensued in foreign countries when a despotic regime controls an
unarmed population. These events are no less relevant to the
Court's international considerations than the fashionable opinions
emanating from the latest world summit.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Second Amendment is not an abstraction. The Founding
Fathers recognized an unarmed populace was a voiceless one. In
their prescience, they understood the right to defend oneself
would transcend time. The Second Amendment is the fountain398. Abram L. Sachar, The Redemption of the Unwanted: From the Liberation of the
Death Camps to the Founding of Israel 47-48 (St. Martin's Press 1983).
399. Polsby & Kates, Jr., supra n. 335, at 1261-62.
400. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States vol. 2, 646 (5th
ed., Da Capo Press 1891).
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head from which all other constitutional rights flow. Reading the
Second Amendment out of existence will have dire consequences
for individuals and liberty alike. The plaintiffs in Parker can attest to such realities.
The D.C. Circuit's stance in Parkerrepresents a retreat from
the narrow interpretation afforded the Second Amendment.
Judges and commentators who embrace a living Constitution that
mirrors an evolving society on issues such as abortion, homosexual rights, and free speech, suddenly yearn for the colonial milieu
of militias and muskets. The D.C. Circuit's rejection of this outdated and inconsistent approach to individual liberty should be
embraced by the Supreme Court, for consistency is the cornerstone of credibility. Furthermore, a robust reading of the Second
Amendment correlates with the evolving standards of firearm
rights. The States regard individual firearm ownership as the
foremost guarantee of safety and freedom. This coincides with the
reality that the District's ordinance fosters, not foils, violent
crime.
Events of the twentieth century demonstrate the Second
Amendment's relevance. The hellish havoc engendered by disarmament stains the pages of history. Defenseless people are left
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of megalomaniacs, foreign invaders,
and fanatical pogroms. Vice President Hubert Humphrey believed "[t]he right of citizens to bear arms is just one more guarantee against arbitrary government, one more safeguard against the
tyranny which now appears remote in America, but which historically has proved to be always possible."4 °1
Respecting individual liberty has guided the modern Supreme
Court's constitutional interpretation. Defending oneself is the
epitome of fundamental liberty. As the guardian of constitutional
guarantees, the Supreme Court must do something it has eschewed for nearly seventy years: breathe life into the Second
Amendment.

401. David B. Kopel, Guns: Who Should Have Them? 195 (Prometheus Books 1995).
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